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Toward a New Constitutional 
Anatomy 
V. F. Nourse* 
There is an important sense in which our Constitution 's structure is not what 
it appears to be - a set of activities or functions or geographies, the "judicial" or 
the "executive" or the "legislative" power, the "truly local and the truly 
national. " Indeed, it is only if we put these notions to the side that we can come to 
grips with the importance of the generative provisions of the Constitution: the 
provisions that actually create our federal government; that bind citizens, 
through voting, to a House of Representatives, to a Senate, to a President, and 
even, indirectly, to a Supreme Court. In this Article, I contend that the deep 
structure of the Constitution is not a set of functions or geographies, but rather a 
political economy of relations between the governed and the governing. Based on 
standard assumptions common in institutional economics, I argue that these 
relations create incentives that can help us predict real (rather than simply 
theoretical) risks to structural change in actual cases involving both the 
separation of powers and federalism. By considering the risk from shifting 
relations not to activity-description but instead to majorities and minorities, we 
may come closer to understanding real risks to shifting power, from states to 
nation and from one national department to another. To this end, against the 
backdrop of constitutional law, I bring to bear the converging meanings of 
history, political science, and lost constitutional text, all of which reveal that the 
canonical view of our Constitution is quite partial to courts and provides an 
incomplete picture of our Constitution as a whole. 
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Introduction 
"A thinking being can, accordingly, act on the basis of the absent and the future, "i 
"The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of 
the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. 
The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether 
in their reasonings on this subject, and to have viewed these different 
establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any 
common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These 
gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the 
ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people 
alone. . . ."2 
By the end of the twentieth century, constitutional law and commentary 
had been preoccupied for decades with the question of judicial review.3 This 
preoccupation focused courts and commentators on the subject of the 
question - the judiciary. Theories of judicial review soon became theories of 
judicial interpretation and theories of judicial interpretation became questions 
about judicial function (analysis of texts, history, and precedent).4 This focus 
l. John Dewey, How We Think 14 (1910). 
2. The Federalist No. 46, at 3 1 5 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1 96 1 ). 
3. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme 
Court at the Bar of Politics (1962); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of 
the Constitution (1982); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National 
Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 
(1980); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
(1980). 
4. See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991) (setting forth a 
set of interpretive modalities); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of 
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should seem odd if one is concerned about the structure of the Constitution as a 
whole. After all, the courts are only one of three departments and arguably the 
least powerful. Indeed, one must wonder whether a theory that begins with the 
courts' view of the Constitution will simply end there. Put another way, the risk 
is that, in the name of judicial review, courts will look into a Constitution with 
three departments and find only one - the judicial one. 
This question of structure has become only more important now that 
scholars have begun moving away from what I will call the "judiciocentric 
position" - the search for a theory of judicial review. New work on popular 
constitutionalism (emphasizing that constitutional interpretation is undertaken 
outside of courts5 and that judicial review has its origins in popular ideals)6 
makes this question particularly salient. For if constitutional meaning is 
policentric,7 if other institutions are capable of deciding and likely to decide 
constitutional questions, how are basic structural matters to be determined? 
Should Congress decide questions about the separation of powers? Should the 
people, in their multivalent social movements,8 decide questions of the 
allocation of power between states and nation? Popular constitutionalism thus 
raises important and unaddressed questions for constitutional structure as a 
whole. In this Article, I offer a way of implementing a more holistic, more 
populist view of structural matters. I reject the judiciocentric position that the 
separation of powers and federalism require recourse to descriptive texts or 
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987) (disputing Bobbin's 
interpretive matrix); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of 
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1983) (critiquing interpretive 
approaches); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063, 1067 (1980) (defending a theory of the 
Constitution intended to protect fundamental values against process-based interpretations). 
5. Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts ( 1 999). 
6. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and 
Judicial Review (forthcoming May 2004) [hereinafter Kramer, Popular 
Constitutionalism] . 
7. On the definition of policentric constitutional interpretation, see Robert C. Post & 
Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric 
Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 1 12 Yale L.J. 1943, 1947 (2003): 
The policentric model holds that for purposes of Section 5 power the Constitution should be 
regarded as having multiple interpreters, both political and legal. The model attributes equal 
interpretive authority to Congress and to the Court. The model thus entails (1) that Congress 
does not violate principles of separation of powers when it enacts Section 5 legislation 
premised on an understanding of the Constitution that differs from the Court's, and (2) that 
Congress's action does not bind the Court, so that the Court remains free to invalidate Section 
5 legislation that in the Court's view violates a constitutional principle requiring judicial 
protection. This account of Section 5 power combines a robust legislative constitutionalism 
with a vigorous commitment to rule-of-law values. 
8. I am referring here to the work within the "Constitution outside the courts" field that 
has focused on social movements. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity- 
Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 419 (2001); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the 
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002). 
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functions9 and argue, instead, that our government is, in important structural 
senses, a set of popular relations. Once one takes that view, one can predict 
with far greater confidence real risks to the people from structural change.10 
The Constitution was created first and foremost to govern, not for the sake 
of constitutional interpretation. x x The revolution of 1787 was hailed as the 
moment not of the courts' arrival or the advent of a new interpretive regime, 
but rather of a new relation between the people and their government. In this 
sense, the Constitution is not only a text for interpreting, but is also an "act," a 
"constituting."12 "[Constitutions not only limit power and prevent tyranny, 
they also construct power."13 For all one would know from theories of 
constitutional interpretation and judicial review, however, this constituting, this 
activity of generating a government, is unimportant; according to the 
judiciocentric position, the Constitution conveys meanings rather than 
constructs power, it refers to the past and dictionaries rather than to the future 
and our real-life relations to one another. I believe that the judiciocentric view 
of the Constitution is partial and I believe that the Constitution - the whole 
Constitution - itself tells us this.14 
To get a quick sense of how unrealistic the view from the judiciocentric 
9. Please note that when I use the term "function," I am not referring to 
"functionalism," which is a particular school of thought associated with the analysis of 
separation of powers questions. See infra text accompanying note 37. Instead, I am referring 
to the idea that a department or a doctrine might have a "purpose" we tend to think of as a 
"function." That includes doctrines that are typically associated with the separation of 
powers (executive, legislative, judicial) as well as doctrines typically associated with 
federalism (the "truly local" or "truly national," see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
617(2000)). 
10. Of course, the "people" is an abstraction that requires a temporal qualifier. Jed 
Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Self-Government 168 (2001) (arguing that 
"written constitutionalism holds that a people achieves self-government not by conforming 
governance to the authoritative democratic will at any given time, but by laying down and 
holding itself to its own democratically authored foundational commitments over time"). 
Indeed, I think one of the major advantages of a constitutive view is that it permits a kind of 
dynamism about the "people," while seeking to ensure against major dislocations of the 
representative relation. 
1 1 . The most recent and eloquent claim in this regard is that made by Larry Kramer. 
See Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6. 
12. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term: Foreword: The Document and 
the Doctrine, 1 14 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 35 (2000). 
13. Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal 
Democracy 6 (1995); see also Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 143 (1963) ("The word 
'constitution' . . . means the act of constituting as well as the law or rules of government that 
are 'constituted.'"); id. at 148 (arguing that the founders aimed to understand "the 
constitution of power"); id. at 150 ("[T]he principle of the separation of power . . . actually 
provides a kind of mechanism . . . through which new power is constantly generated. . . ."). 
14. In the effort to insist on this position, I am standing on the shoulders of many, 
including, most especially, Professors Ackerman and Black. See Bruce Ackerman, We the 
People: Foundations (1991); Charles Black, Structure and Relationship in 
Constitutional Law ( 1 969). 
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position can be, just focus on a few key structural terms: the words "executive," 
"judicial," and "legislative," as they appear in the vesting clauses.15 These are 
the terms that form the central focus of structural controversies and academic 
commentary on those controversies.16 Now commit interpretive heresy: 
eliminate these terms from the document. Do courts cease deciding cases? Does 
the government halt its operations? Hardly. Indeed, very little happens to our 
government if these three words are excised from the text's vesting clauses. 
Now, eliminate the practices of government generated by the text - the 
practices of voting and representation - and what happens? There is no 
Congress, there is no one in the White House, and there is no one to appoint 
Supreme Court justices; in fact, there is no government at all.17 
This raises an important question: Why is it that lawyers and courts have 
subordinated these practices to other texts, why have they subordinated 
relations that "govern" to words "to be interpreted?" One answer is that the 
judiciocentric position tends to privilege parts of the document; those parts that 
seem most like "ordinary" statute-law,18 that look as if they can or should be 
15. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in 
a Congress of the United States 
			 "); U.S. Const, art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."); U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1 
("The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). Despite the 
scholarly focus on these clauses, they have little impact on constituting government and its 
practices. By contrast, clauses such as those instituting voting and describing the manner of 
elections have not received the attention they deserve. See infra note 1 7. 
16. Academic commentary, conservative and liberal alike, has tended to take the 
functional terms in the vesting clauses as a starting point. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, Realism in 
Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 343 (1989) (taking a functional 
and liberal position); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: 
Some Lessons from History, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 275 (1989) (using a traditionally 
conservative position (reliance on history) to advocate a different view of the meaning of 
"executive"); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern'': The Need 
for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991) (taking 
a pragmatic formalist position). Most if not all of the Supreme Court's cases on separation of 
powers tend to proceed from understandings that depend upon the idea of function. See, e.g., 
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (concluding that an individual lawsuit would not 
impermissibly interfere with "judicial" or "executive" functions); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 
U.S. 714 (1986) (concluding that "executive" power had been entrusted to an officer over 
whom there was "legislative" control); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (opinions 
disagreeing over whether the legislative veto should be characterized as legislative, 
adjudicative, or a standard delegation to the executive). 
17. U.S. Const, art. I, §§ 2-3 (establishing the process by which members of the House 
of Representatives and the Senate are elected); U.S. Const, art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. Const, amend. XII (creating the process by which 
presidents are elected); U.S. Const, amend. XVII (providing for the direct election of 
senators). It is these bodies, in turn, which nominate and confirm Supreme Court justices. 
U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power, subject to Senate approval, to 
appoint justices to the Supreme Court). 
18. On the important difference between the Constitution as fundamental law and as 
ordinary law, see Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6. For a full 
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"interpreted," or that fit with an ideal of what the judiciary does and can do 
(reading texts and precedents). In such a world, however, it seems fair to ask 
whether our government has been imagined by courts in their own image.19 
In this Article, I try to show that an alternative view - a constitutive 
view - of the Constitution can better enable us to understand important 
questions about constitutional structure. At the center of the idea of a 
constitutive position is the notion of an economy of vertical relations between 
the governed and the governing, relations that create what we conventionally 
call the separation of powers and federalism. I then apply basic principles 
drawn from the literature on political economy (and, in particular, institutional 
economics) to flesh out an alternate view of the implications when we shift 
power from one set of governing relations to another. To this end, I take the 
unusual position of considering risks both to majorities and minorities from 
shifting structural relations (thus considering risks found in the literature on 
public choice and positive political theory along with the more conventional 
constitutional concern regarding risks to minorities). I then apply this analysis 
to some traditional problems surrounding separation of powers and federalism 
caselaw. I have chosen rather well-known problems because I want to show not 
only that this theory improves our understanding of the "whole" text, but also 
that understanding the constitutive Constitution can do important work in 
predicting realistic risks to governance. 
In Part I, I recount a conventional way of viewing structural problems, 
shared in the law of federalism and the separation of powers, and offer a 
competing vision - one which conceives constitutional structure less as an 
allocation of functions or textual descriptions (executive, judicial, etc.) than as 
an allocation of real-life constituencies and their relationships to different parts 
of our government. In this Part, I develop a model that focuses on the way in 
which the constitutive provisions of the Constitution20 create relations between 
the governed and governing, and I argue that "function" (whether it be the 
function denoted by the term "executive" or "judicial" or that by the "truly 
exposition of this argument, see infra Part IV. 
19. I confess that 1 have feared this for some time, see Victoria F. Nourse, Making 
Constitutional Doctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1401 (1997), because it is in 
the nature of all institutions to "think themselves." See Mary Douglas, How Institutions 
Think 55 (1986) ("Nothing else but institutions can define sameness. Similarity is an 
institution. Elements get assigned to sets where institutions find their own analogies in 
nature."). 
20. By "constitutive provisions," I mean the provisions of the Constitution that provide 
for elections of Congress and the President and appointment of Supreme Court Justices. 
These provisions include: Article I, Section 2, creating a House of Representatives whose 
members are to be elected by the people aggregated by population; and Article I, Section 3, 
creating a Senate whose members are to be elected, now, by the people of the states; Article 
II, Section 1 , providing for the election of the President by the nation through an electoral 
college; and Article II, Section 2, providing for the appointment of the Supreme Court 
justices by the nationally elected President and their confirmation by the state population- 
elected Senate. 
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local" and the "truly national") serves as too crude a proxy for more refined, 
off-stage, and often-conflicting, normative judgments about risks to majorities 
and minorities. 
In Parts II and III, I illustrate how this all "works," by applying it to 
familiar, but recurrent, problems of categorical contradiction in both separation 
of powers and federalism cases (specifically, Chadha and Morrison). It is here 
that I argue that a political economy of relations is more predictive of real 
structural risk than current linguistic contenders. If we look not at functions but 
instead at shifting political relations, we can far better assess risks to the 
people, whether these are risks to majorities or minorities. In both of these 
parts, I urge that structural issues conventionally considered to be quite distinct 
(federalism and the separation of powers) are implied in each other - that 
separation of powers cases have implied federalism dimensions and federalism 
cases have implied separation of powers dimensions. Finally, in Part IV, I 
consider the most important question: Why has the judiciocentric position 
helped us to create theories that silence the Constitution's generativity, its 
creation of power? For in such silencing, we have (inadvertently or not) ended 
up privileging dictionaries over voting, interpretive modes over 
representational relations, and judicial supremacy over popular governance. 
I. Rethinking Conventional Structural Wisdom 
If there is a shared problem in the doctrines of federalism and the 
separation of powers, it is due at least in part to a shared assumption about the 
constitutional text. Although the relevant texts in federalism and separation of 
powers cases are thought to differ, judicial approaches toward these problems 
share an assumption that there are governing descriptive texts and that these 
texts must be matched with the activities under review. The relevant 
constitutional language is viewed as a set of descriptive labels, a set of terms 
like "executive," "state," or "judicial" (terms that seem ripe for definition or 
drawing boundaries), and texts are then matched against the challenged practice 
under review. In structural cases, whether ones of federalism or the separation 
of powers, it is thought enough for a court, for example, to dub the President a 
lawmaker;21 to find a "traditional governmental function";22 or to insist that a 
particular activity involves "executive" power.23 
21. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) ("In the 
framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully 
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."). 
22. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) ("We hold that insofar 
as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the 
authority granted Congress. . . ."). 
23. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the 
President's power as unitary: "[T]his does not mean some o/the executive power, but all of 
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A. The Matching Game 
It is precisely this effort, this "matching game," that has created such 
difficulty with the Supreme Court's structural decisions. In both separation of 
powers cases and federalism cases, the twentieth century has seen repeated 
failures of doctrine; almost every critical adjective imaginable has been thrown 
at structural doctrine, from "unpredictable" to "abysmal" to "contradictory."24 
In the past fifty years, the law of constitutional structure has vacillated between 
categorical enthusiasm and distaste; aggressive judicial enforcement and 
contrite deference to the political branches; judicial review and no judicial 
review. In both federalism25 and separation of powers cases,26 courts and 
commentators have moved from formalism to functionalism and back to 
formalism again.27 
the executive power"). 
24. Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent 
De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 BYU L. Rev. 719, 760-61 (stating that the 
courts' conflicting traditions in the separation of powers amount to "muddling through," 
leaving one "rarely able from one year to the next to predict how the Justices will view the 
next problem to arise"); E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is 
So Abysmal, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 506 (1989) (suggesting, as the article's title indicates, 
the poverty of the case law); Philip Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of 
Separation of Powers, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 601 (1986) (arguing that the doctrine is not 
consistent and that its coherency, if any, comes from the actions - often contradictory - 
which spur the doctrine's consideration). 
25. The post-New Deal academic cycle in federalism begins with Wechsler's claim 
that courts should defer to the political process. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in Composition and Selection of the 
National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). This is met with Van Alstyne's 
disbelief. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 
1709, 1724 n.64 (1985) (indicating that the Wechsler political process argument (adopted by 
Justice Blackmun in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)) was 
little better than "a good hearted joke"). The Wechsler argument has been ever so elegantly 
resurrected by Larry Kramer, with the aid of some standard political science. See Larry D. 
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. 
L. Rev. 215 (2000); Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485 
(1994) [hereinafter Kramer, Understanding]; see also WILLIAM H. RlKER, FEDERALISM: 
Origin, Operation, Significance (1964). 
26. In the separation of powers area, the post-New Deal embrace of functionalism 
(tantamount to deference) begins with the embrace of Steel Seizure's "workable" 
government formula. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). That formulation is met by the Unitarians, on the one hand, see 
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, 
Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992), and by the originalists on the other, see 
Stephen L. Carter, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term: The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 
Harv. L. Rev. 105 (1988) [hereinafter Carter, Independent Counsel], only to have 
pragmatism reworked by Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein (in translated mode), see 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. 
Rev. 1 (1994). 
27. The distinction between formalism and functionalism is a staple of much academic 
commentary on both federalism and the separation of powers. See Rebecca L. Brown, 
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Indeed, the stock stories academic commentators tell about both federalism 
and the separation of powers are moralized as tales of the wisdom and dangers 
of formalism. For example, in federalism matters, there is the cautionary 
narrative of the New Deal, where the Court reversed the grave indignity of 
earlier attempts to corral "commerce" as "manufacture." That narrative, 
however, has hardly discouraged the Supreme Court from flirting once again 
with formalism. In the 1980s, the Court attempted to revive the Tenth 
Amendment through the rubric of "traditional state functions,"28 an attempt 
that soon failed once the rubric became too difficult to manage.29 More 
recently, we have seen evidence of a new kind of formalist cycle, with 
categories ascendant in United States v. Lopez and New York v. United States, 
cases that have given us new tests for "economic" activity and 
"anticommandeering."30 Only time will tell how long it will be before this 
Supreme Court finds that its new federalism categories cannot be managed. 
A similar tale can be told about the separation of powers cases. By the 
decade after the New Deal, it was thought that formalism had been routed in 
the law of separated powers. The move toward a more pragmatic view was 
canonized in casebooks with Justice Jackson's celebrated concurrence in the 
Steel Seizure case.31 With the fame of Justice Jackson's call for a "workable 
government"32 came judicial decisions that were far more deferential to 
politically inspired structural innovation.33 But, as was the case with federalism 
doctrine, this temporary equilibrium did not last. By the middle of the 1980s, 
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1522-31 (1991) 
(contrasting formal and functional approaches in separation of powers cases); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 
92-95 (1995) (contrasting formal and functional approaches in federalism cases). For a 
wonderfully illuminating dialogue on these conflicting views, see H. Jefferson Powell & Jed 
Rubenfeld, Laying It on the Line: A Dialogue on Line Item Vetoes and Separation of 
Powers, 47 Duke L.J. 1171 (1998). 
28. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
29. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
30. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992). For more recent usages of these categories, see United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000) (applying the Lopez economic/commercial standard) and Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (applying New York's anticommandeering rule). 
31. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
32. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the 
better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers 
into a workable government."). 
33. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (using the "workable government" principle announced in 
Steel Seizure to reject the President's claim of absolute privilege as against a subpoena); see 
also United States v. Cowan, 396 F. Supp. 803, 805 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (holding that the 
"appointment by a court of special prosecutors to prosecute a valid existing indictment is not 
incongruous with the separation of powers doctrine" and citing the "workable government" 
formulation). 
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categorical formalism was on the rise again. In a series of decisions, the 
Supreme Court appeared to reinvigorate a formal tripartite branch division.34 
The movement was never as uniform as in the federalism sphere,35 but it was 
distinctive, turning the law full circle to the categorical days when Justice 
Black and, before him, Chief Justice Taft, declared that powers simply were 
"lawmaking" or "executive" and that this was sufficient to resolve the 
dispute.36 
Much of the academic commentary on both federalism and the separation 
of powers has tended to suggest that "functionalism" must be the wiser, more 
liberal approach. But, as others have pointed out, and as I have tried to 
demonstrate elsewhere, there is a kind of formalism built into this aspiration 
toward a kinder, gentler functionalist doctrine.37 Functionalism, too, relies 
upon categorical boundaries: One must compare some descriptive or labeling 
claim with another - whether it is labeling the challenged practice or labeling 
the status quo as "executive," "legislative," or as a "traditional state function." 
The formalist asks how to describe the challenged practice and then seeks a 
close match between that description and "existing" descriptions of the 
departments. The functionalist asks a similar question, but differs in the degree 
of the "match" required, asking whether the challenged practice undermines the 
definition of an existing department or state function defined, again, by 
descriptive label. As Mark Tushnet wrote long ago, formalism and 
functionalism in structural matters are not opposed in their methodology but 
only in their advocated results and attitude toward structural change.38 The 
34. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down the Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings budget act); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down the 
legislative veto). 
35. There were notable lapses in the formal model, lapses that have since come to be 
regretted by many. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (applying a 
"functional" approach after the Court had begun to adopt more "formal" analyses). 
Similarly, the functionalist "period" was more of an assumption than a set of holdings - an 
assumption based largely on cases generated by the controversy over the Watergate tapes. 
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (adopting a formal approach in the 
"functional" era). 
36. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 587 ("In the framework of our 
Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the 
idea that he is to be a lawmaker."); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) ("The 
ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute come under the general administrative 
control of the President by virtue of the general grant to him of the executive power, and he 
may properly supervise and guide their construction of the statutes under which they act in 
order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the 
Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President 
alone."). 
37. Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749 (1999) 
[hereinafter Nourse, Vertical Separation]', see also Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing 
Commission and Constitutional Theory: Bowls and Plateaus in Separation of Powers 
Theory, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 581, 596 (1992) [hereinafter Tushnet, Bowls and Plateaus]. 
38. Tushnet, Bowls and Plateaus, supra note 37, at 604. For a different, and 
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formalist looks for perfect descriptive symmetry while the functionalist is 
willing to tolerate greater structural innovation. Functional analysis aspires, 
clearly, to a greater realism and yet, too often, it simply shifts the burden, 
beginning and ending with a greater tolerance for change, no matter the 
consequences of that change. 
B. The Constitution of Power 
I seek to investigate the constitution of power as much as its description 
and thus, to understand the effects of shifting governmental structure on 
relations between the governed and the governing.39 To undertake this inquiry, 
one need not give up on text or history, nor don the hat of a political scientist.40 
One must simply give up the judiciocentric position - the idea that the only 
constitutional texts worth applying or understanding are what I will call the 
"descriptive texts," the texts that describe the departments or levels of 
government (either in terms of "functions" or what we call "powers"). Instead, 
one must focus on a different set of texts that, quite literally, "constitute" 
government,41 that create practices that I call the Constitution's "vertical" and 
"horizontal" relations. 
Let us begin with an effort at imaginative reconstruction. Imagine that you 
were at the Constitutional Convention. And imagine further that you were 
trying to form a government. Would you begin to determine the contours of 
illuminating, view to the contrary, see Powell & Rubenfeld, supra note 27, at 1204-05. 
39. This is an attempt at "explanation by embodiment," one that looks to the practice of 
governing and the relations embedded within it. See Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of 
Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 5-6 (2001). 
40. Having said this, I cast no aspersions on the discipline of political science. Indeed, 
many of my conclusions are quite consistent with the predictions of positive political theory. 
See infra notes 80, 81, 148; see also Jenna Bednar, William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John 
Ferejohn, A Political Theory of Federalism, in Constitutional Culture and Democratic 
Rule 223 (John Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove & Jonathan Riley eds., 2001) (arguing that our 
constitutional structure and, in particular, federalism, is attractive but problematic, given the 
claims of positive political theory that a decentralized system best satisfies popular 
preferences). It is simply that I reject the notion that these cases are "too hard" for courts 
because courts lack the capacity to understand the political departments. See, e.g., Tushnet, 
Bowls and Plateaus, supra note 37, at 596 (doubting that judges have the political 
experience or capacity to use "social science" information to apply "functional" models of 
the separation of powers). The Supreme Court has a constitutional obligation to understand 
the entire Constitution, including those parts of the Constitution that constitute the political 
departments. 
41. These provisions include Article I, Section 2, creating a House of Representatives 
whose members are to be elected by the people aggregated by population; and Article I, 
Section 3, creating a Senate whose members are to be elected, now, by the people of the 
states. See also U.S. Const, amend. XVII. The representational texts also include Article II, 
Section 1, providing for the election of the President by the nation through an electoral 
college and Article II, Section 2, providing for the appointment of the Supreme Court 
Justices by the nationally elected President and their confirmation by the state-population- 
elected Senate. 
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federalism by defining the term "commerce?" Or would you begin by trying to 
determine who would have the right to vote for your new government?42 
Would you begin by defining "executive" or would you spend most of the 
summer determining who would elect the President?43 Would you seek first to 
define judicial power or worry more about how judges would be selected?44 To 
any student of the Constitutional Convention, the answers to these questions are 
obvious. Any quick survey of the debates from the Convention or the 
ratification will reveal that, in fact, the founders did not spend most of their 
time debating precise terminology; the debates were dominated by general 
constitutive or structural questions. Indeed, notes of the debate and ratification 
are pregnant with silences about the terms that so engage courts today. The 
debates are filled, by contrast, with questions about rule by the few and the 
42. See generally Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the 
Making of the Constitution 60 (1996) (describing how "it was Madison's insistence on 
solving the problem of representation first that set the course of debate"). See also id. at 76 
("Thus when a conciliating Gerry suggested that 'it might be better to proceed to enumerate 
and define the powers to be vested in the Genl. Govt.' before deciding the rule of voting, 
Madison repeated that such determinations had to await resolution of the rule of 
representation.") (discussing debate of July 13, 1787). The question of whether the national 
legislature would represent the states or the people occupied much of the early part of the 
convention and, to avoid complete rupture, the large states eventually agreed to 
"compromise," leaving representation by the states in the Senate and representation by 
population in the House. On this familiar story, see id. ch. 4 at 57-93. Compare 1 The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 151 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) 
(Madison's notes, June 7, 1787) (statement of James Wilson) (urging popular representation 
in both houses) [hereinafter Federal Convention], with 1 id. at 154 (Madison's notes, July 
7, 1 787) (statement of Roger Sherman) (moving to allow state legislatures to elect Senators), 
and 1 id. at 154-55 (Madison's notes) (statements of Elbridge Gerry and Charles Pinckney) 
(supporting election by the state legislatures). 
43. The question of how to elect the President was repeatedly addressed by the 
convention. Indeed, up until the last month or so, the President was still to be elected by the 
House of Representatives. See, e.g., 2 Federal Convention, supra note 42, at 29-36 
(Madison's notes, July 17, 1787) (debating the election of the President by the Congress). 
Compare 2 id. at 29 (Madison's notes, July 17, 1787) (reporting statements of proponents, 
like Mr. Sherman of Connecticut, who thought that "the sense of the Nation would be better 
expressed by the Legislature, than by the people at large"), with 2 id. at 30 (Madison's notes, 
July 1 7, 1 787) (reporting statements of opponents, like Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania, that the 
President under such a system "would be too dependent" on the House); see also 2 id. at 497 
(Madison's notes, Sept. 4, 1787) (reporting the Committee of Eleven's resolutions proposing 
an electoral college-type alternative). 
44. On judicial selection, see, for example, 1 Federal Convention, supra note 42, at 
220, 232-33 (Madison's notes, June 13, 1787) (resuming debate on a resolution that had 
struck out the provisions relating to the jurisdiction of courts "in order to leave full room for 
their organization"); id. (motion of Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Sherman to have the national 
judiciary appointed by the "national legislature"). But see 2 id. at 233 (statement of Mr. 
Madison) (urging that the appointment of the national judiciary should be by the Senate); 2 
id. at 40-44 (Madison's notes, July 18, 1787) (debating, without resolution, the "mode of 
appointment" of the Judges and, whether it should be by the Executive or the Senate or a 
combination of the two). 
February 2004] TOWARD A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ANA TOMY 847 
many,45 dependence and independence of political actors,46 and, inevitably, 
representation.47 Indeed, it seems fair to say that it was the conflict over the 
45. See, e.g., Brutus, No. Ill, N.Y. J., Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in Creating the 
Constitution: A History in Documents 157, 159 (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler 
eds., 1991) [hereinafter Creating the Constitution: Documents] (arguing against the 
Constitution that "[i]t will literally be a government in the hands of the few to oppress and 
plunder the many"); IX The Documentary History of the Ratification of the 
Constitution: Ratification by the States: Virginia, Vol. 2, at 1113-14 (John P. 
Kaminiski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) (statement of James Monroe, June 10, 1788) 
(arguing against the proposed composition of Congress on the ground that neither the Senate 
nor the House would be "responsible" to the people); X The Documentary History of the 
Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification by the States: Virginia, supra, at 1376 
(statement of George Mason, June 18, 1788) (criticizing the "marriage" of the Senate and the 
President effected by the Constitution: "We know the advantage the few have over the 
many. . . . They may join scheme and plot against the people without any chance of 
detection."); An Officer of the Late Continental Army, Phil. Indep. Gazeteer, Nov. 6, 1787, 
reprinted in Creating the Constitution: Documents, supra, at 151 (arguing against the 
Constitution that, "The most important branches of the EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT are to 
be put into the hands of a single magistrate, who will be in fact an ELECTIVE KING."). But 
see 1 Federal Convention, supra note 42, at 94 (Madison's notes, July 19, 1787) 
(statement of Mr. Governeur Morris) (arguing for the Constitution that "[t]he Executive 
therefore ought to be so constituted as to be the great protector of the Mass of the people"). 
46. On the importance of these concepts, see Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due 
Foundation" for the Separation of Powers: The Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 
Tex L. Rev 447, 456-57, 460-63 (1996) [hereinafter Nourse, Due Foundation]', see also 1 
Federal Convention, supra note 42, at 59 (Pierce's notes, May 31, 1787) (statement of 
Roger Sherman) (arguing that appointment of Senators by the House and out of its ranks 
"would make [the Senators] too dependent, and thereby destroy the end for which the Senate 
ought to be appointed") (emphasis added); 1 id. at 58-59 (Pierce's notes, May 31, 1787) 
(statement of James Wilson) (arguing for popular election of the Senate so as to insure its 
independence from the national legislature) (emphasis added); 1 id. at 59 (Pierce's notes, 
May 31, 1787) (statement of George Mason) (expressing the opinion that drawing the Senate 
out of the first branch "would make the Members too dependent on the first branch," in 
addition to being impractical and "improper") (emphasis added). Dependence was an 
important theme of the debate over a variety of other issues, from the method of payment for 
government officials to the manner of their election. See, e.g., 1 id. at 215-16 (Madison's 
notes, June 1 2, 1 787) (statement of James Madison) (arguing that payment of the members 
of the national legislature by the states would "create an improper dependence") (emphasis 
added); 2 id. at 292 (Madison's notes, Aug. 14, 1787) (statement of Daniel Carroll) (likening 
a Congress paid by the State legislatures to a mere "second edition" of the Articles of 
Confederation's federal legislature, in its "dependence] on ... the States") (emphasis 
added); 1 id. at 175 (Madison's notes, June 9, 1787) (statement by James Madison) (arguing 
that appointing the President by the legislature would lessen that independence which ought 
to prevail" among the branches of government) (emphasis added); 1 id. at 68 (Madison's 
notes, June 1, 1787) (statement of Roger Sherman) (favoring legislative appointment of the 
President so as to make him "absolutely dependent" on the legislature) (emphasis added); 2 
id. at 102 (Madison's notes, July 24, 1787) (statement of Elbridge Gerry) (arguing that the 
President should serve for as many as 20 years to diminish his "dependence" on the 
legislature if elected by that body) (emphasis added); 2 id. at 102 (Madison's notes, July 24, 
1 787) (statement of James Wilson) (agreeing to "almost any length of time" for presidential 
tenure to eliminate the "dependence" that will result from appointment by the legislature) 
(emphasis added). 
47. Representation itself was much debated. Compare II The Documentary History 
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relation between the governed and their new federal government, as reflected in 
the classic struggle over the relation between the states and the nation, that 
served as one of the most significant factors in framing the Constitution's 
horizontal as well as vertical structure, the separation of powers as well as 
federalism.48 
If we are to take seriously the original structure then we must understand 
that the framers were creating a government, not interpreting it. The framers 
did not come to the convention armed with dictionaries but, instead, with 
political experience.49 They faced real dangers of political failure, popular 
rebellion, and governmental impotence; they had to worry that their new 
Constitution would be transformed in a sudden flash of violence, a rebellion, or 
a coup - or, worse yet, a return to monarchical subjugation.50 Indeed, it was 
of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification by the States: Pennsylvania 
343-44 (John P. Kaminiski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) (statement of James Wilson, 
Nov. 24, 1787) ("[T]he world has left to America the glory and happiness of forming a 
government where representation shall at once supply the basis and the cement of the 
superstructure. For, representation, sir, is the true chain between the people and those to 
whom they entrust the administration of the government . . ."), with Brutus No. Ill, N.Y. J., 
Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in Creating the Constitution: Documents, supra note 45, at 
157 ("The very term, representative, implies that the person or body chosen for this purpose, 
should resemble those who appoint them .... In this respect, the new Constitution is 
radically defective."); id. at 159 ("[I]n reality, there will be no part of the people represented, 
but the rich, even in that branch of the legislature, which is called the democratic"). Debates 
about representation were also debates about consolidation, one of the Antifederalists' major 
objections to the Constitution. See, e.g., II The Documentary History of the 
Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification by the States: Pennsylvania, supra, 
at 425 (statement of Robert Whitehill, Nov. 30, 1787) ("I have said, and with increasing 
confidence I repeat, that the proposed Constitution must eventually annihilate the 
independent sovereignty of the several states. In answer to this, the forms of election for 
supplying the offices of the federal head have been recapitulated . . . ."). 
48. See, e.g., Harry Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The Original 
Understanding, in Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber, American Law and 
the Constitutional Order: Historical Perspectives 85, 88 (1988 ed.) ("In a sense, 
every succeeding decision of the convention flowed from this decision on representation."). 
Even debates about the judiciary were carried on in terms of the state/federal relation and 
popular control. For example, in the Virginia ratification debates, George Mason argued that 
Article III would "destroy" the states. X The Documentary History of the Ratification 
of the Constitution: Ratification by the States: Virginia, supra note 45, at 1402 
(statement of George Mason, June 19, 1788) ("When we consider the nature of these Courts, 
we must conclude, that their effect and operation will be utterly to destroy the State 
Governments."). James Madison responded that the judiciary's power was the least likely to 
be abused because it would raise the "indignation of all the people of the States. I cannot 
conceive that they [the judges] would encounter this odium." Id. at 1416 (June 20, 1788). 
49. See generally Rakove, supra note 42, at 29-31 (discussing the influence of the 
political experience with state constitutions on the formation of the federal Constitution); 
Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, at 467 (1998) 
(arguing that the experience of politics in the states, which led one contemporary to dub 
them the "vile state governments," was as important a spur to reform of the Articles of 
Confederation as was the weakness of the central government). 
50. See X The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: 
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their experiences of state constitutional failures that were the "crucial lessons" 
applied in their deliberations.51 It was those experiences, for example, that 
foretold that "parchment barriers" were insufficient to protect the government 
from dissolution into an excess of democracy or its opposite number, 
aristocracy. Time and time again, the state constitutions had demonstrated the 
weakness of lawyers' text when it came to the most cherished of structural 
principles. Constitutions, like that in Virginia, had explicitly demanded that 
each department remain "separate and distinct."52 And yet no matter how 
insistently the word aimed to "structure" government, life disobeyed, yielding 
routine failures and legislative corruption.53 The only way to cabin power, in 
Madison's view, was to understand its dynamics - to understand its incentives 
and its risks in the hands of those who hold it.54 The only way to counter power 
was to make a self-executing system of competing relations and incentives. 
This brief history, which I and others have told at greater length, should 
give one pause about modern structural theory, but it should not send us into 
despair. The standard questions about constitutional structure depend upon a 
claim of authority based on a particular set of words drawn from constitutional 
texts.55 Write them down, if you care to: "executive," "judicial," and 
Ratification by the States: Virginia, supra note 45, at 1287 (statement of James 
Madison, June 14, 1788) ("What is the situation of this country at this moment? Is it not 
rapidly approaching to anarchy? Are not the bands of the Union so absolutely relaxed as 
almost to amount to a dissolution? What has produced despotism and tyranny in other parts 
of the world?"). See generally Wood, supra note 49, at 464-65 (discussing the collapse of 
Congress and political rebellion in the states as among the reasons for constitutional reform). 
See also id. at 466 ('The ability of America to sustain any sort of republican government 
seemed to be at issue."). 
5 1 . Rakove, supra note 42, at 30-3 1 ("By far the greatest influence that the experience 
of the states exerted on the deliberations of 1787 lay . ... in the area of constitutional theory 
itself. For when the framers set about designing the new national government, the crucial 
lessons they applied were drawn from their observation of the state constitutions written 
since independence ... By the mid- 1780s ... all [the state constitutions] had come in for 
careful scrutiny and mounting criticism as the experience of war and the dissatisfactions of 
peacetime generated complaints about the shortcomings of state government."). 
52. See THE Federalist No. 48, at 335 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) 
(detailing the Virginia provision on the separation of powers). 
53. See id. at 335-36 (borrowing Jefferson's argument that a strict separation of powers 
text had failed to provide for an adequate separation of powers in practice and, indeed had 
devolved into legislative tyranny, because the other departments were too dependent upon 
the legislature). For a more extended argument on these essays, see Nourse, Due 
Foundation, supra note 46, at 468-70. 
54. The Federalist No. 51, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Jacob 
Cooke ed., 1961) ("But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several 
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department 
the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the 
others. . . . Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be 
connected with the constitutional rights of the place."). 
55. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that the independent counsel was exercising "executive" power); I.N.S. v. 
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"legislative"; add "commerce," "state," and "reserved," if you will.56 Now, 
think of the absent and the future57 - what one has for a government. There is 
no room in this list for voting or elections or representation. Indeed, there is no 
room for either the governed or the governing. And, as a result, if these words 
are all there is to constitutional federalism and the separation of powers, then 
the White House is empty, the Congressional chambers silent, and there are no 
Justices. The same cannot be said of the constitutive provisions of the 
Constitution - strike Article I, Section 2, and you have no House of 
Representatives;58 strike Article I, Section 3,59 and you have no Senate; strike 
Article II, Section 1, Clauses 2 and 3,60 and you have no President. Strike all of 
these, and Section 2 of Article II, and there is no one to nominate or confirm 
anyone to the Supreme Court.61 Indeed, there is no federal government at all 
because one has severed the relation of the people to their government. 
C. Shifting Power, Shifting Relations 
The Constitution's constitutive texts link the people to their government in 
vertical relation.62 The people vote, directly, for members of the House63 and 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (seeking to assess whether the legislative veto was in fact 
"legislative" action). 
56. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 1 ("legislative"); U.S. Const, art. II, § 1 ("executive"); 
U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1 ("judicial"); U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("commerce"); U.S. 
Const, art. IV, § 4 ("State"); U.S. Const, amend. X ("States" and "reserved to the States"). 
57. See Dewey, supra note 1, at 14 ("A thinking being can, accordingly, act on the 
basis of the absent and the future."). 
58. U.S. Const, art. I, § 2 (creating a House of Representatives whose members are to 
be elected by the people aggregated by population). 
59. U.S. Const, art. I, § 3 (creating a Senate whose members are to be elected by state 
legislatures). This provision has, of course, been amended. The Senate is elected by the 
people of the states, per the Seventeenth Amendment. U.S. Const, amend. XVII. 
60. U.S. Const, art. II, § 1, cl. 2-3 (providing for the election of the President); see 
also id. at amend. XII. 
61. U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, provides that the President shall "nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme court." If 
one eliminates the Senate and the President, of course, this provision would be inoperable. 
62. There are, of course, a variety of complex social, cultural, and even economic 
factors that go into making these relations "live." One cannot, for example, have a working 
representative relation without the people having a basic sense of trust in their government. 
See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, 
Consequences and Reform 26 (1999) (stating that pervasive corruption undermines the 
legitimacy of government); Amy Chua, Markets, Democracy & Ethnicity: Toward a New 
Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 Yale L.J. 1, 56 (1998) (noting, in the context of 
developing democracies, how "too much corruption effectively can subvert the political 
process, replacing democracy with kleptocracy"). These factors, however important, do not 
undermine the claim I make here that relations of representation, in the thin sense of the term 
"relation," constitute government. 
63. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State 
legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the 
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the Senate; they vote and, through the Electoral College, elect a President and, 
in far more attenuated fashion, they authorize the Senate and the President to 
choose Supreme Court justices.64 These are central constitutional "doings" or 
"practices"; they are acts that create relations between the people and their 
federal government.65 Those relations - between citizens and the federal 
government - affect the relations between state citizens and their state 
governments. We fought a civil war to establish the simple proposition that no 
one may be deprived, by a state, of national citizenship.66 We also know that 
the federal Constitution "guarantees" a relationship between the states and the 
people, a relationship characterized as "republican."67 Finally, we know that 
there are intersections of these intrafederal and federal-state relationships: that 
citizens, organized in states rather than a nation, elect the House and the Senate, 
and that this feature of the Congress, as an institution, makes it relatively more 
likely (than the executive) to respond to locally aggregated constituencies and 
to find its political fortunes tied to those of state political officials.68 
The vertical relations created by the Constitution, invite us to ask very 
present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the 
people. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the 
example in most of the States. Even the judges with all other offices of the Union, will, as in 
the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves. 
The Federalist No. 39, at 252 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961). 
64. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 2 (creating a House of Representatives with members to 
be elected by the people aggregated by population); U.S. Const, art. I, § 3 (creating a Senate 
with members to be elected, now, by the people of the states); U.S. Const, amend. XVII 
(providing for the electoral process for Senators); U.S. Const, art. II, § 1 (providing for the 
election of the President by the nation through an electoral college); U.S. Const, art. II, § 2 
(providing for the appointment of members of the Supreme Court by the nationally elected 
President and confirmation by the state-population-elected Senate). 
65. Amar, supra note 12, at 35 (emphasizing the constitutive aspects of the document). 
See John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language 33-34 
(1969), for a discussion of the difference between constitutive and regulative rules: 
[R]egulative rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior; for 
example, many rules of etiquette regulate inter-personal relationships which exist 
independently of the rules. But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define 
new forms of behavior. The rules of football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate 
playing football or chess, but as it were they create the very possibility of playing such 
games. 
66. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside."). 
67. U.S. Const, art. IV, § 4 ('The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against 
Invasion . . . ."). 
68. On the responsiveness of members of Congress to more local constituencies, see R. 
Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action 7 (1990) ("[W]hen legislators 
have to make a decision they first ask which alternative contributes more to their chances for 
reelection..."). For some of the political links between members of Congress and state 
officials, see Kramer, Understanding, supra note 25, at 1523-29 (arguing that political 
parties create "relationships" and establish "obligations among officials that cut across 
government planes" and thus tie local to federal officials). 
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different questions of power than do traditional theories of federalism and the 
separation of powers. They invite us to ask - not how power is described in the 
Constitution (as, for example, "judicial," "executive," or "state") but, instead - 
how changing power shifts constitutional relations between the governed and 
the governing. Let me emphasize, however, the limited reach of this claim. My 
argument is not that we should jettison functional categories as such; they are 
often useful shorthand. (Indeed, to the extent I am asked to put myself within 
the traditional academic camps on structural questions, I identify myself as a 
functionalist - where that is defined as giving "reasons," rather than raw labels, 
to explain structural decisions.) My claim is that the notion of a "function" is 
often a poor proxy and that no constitutional anatomy can be complete without 
understanding that structural ideals like federalism and the separation of powers 
do more than protect the linguistic integrity of the functions described in the 
vesting clauses - they also protect the people and their relation to government. 
This "constitutive approach" may sound abstract, but it is grounded in 
uncontroversial intuitions about constitutional power. For example, let us 
imagine that some oddball proposed shifting the war power from the Congress 
to the Supreme Court. If we are worried about such a decision, we are worried 
not because of the definition of power at issue - we do not go running to a 
dictionary, for example, to investigate the meaning of "war" nor do we sit 
pondering the question of the "function" of war. We are worried, instead, 
because of the political relations that govern its decision: We are worried that 
the Court will go to war without the people. A similar analysis applies to 
federalism decisions. Assume that our oddball proposes to shift the power to 
declare war to the states. Again, our worries are unlikely to be resolved by 
struggling over the meaning of the war power or whether the militia is a 
"traditional state function." We worry not because of definitions or descriptions 
but because, when the planes are in the air, we wonder whether the states could 
agree to go to war at all. 
And, lest this example seem outlandish and academic, consider the similar 
effects of a more modest and plausible case - for example, if Congress were to 
give to the federal courts the power to nominate inferior officers in the 
Executive Department.69 The Constitution specifically provides that the 
Congress may grant the power to appoint "inferior officers" not only to the 
"heads of departments" (where it is normally lodged) but also to the "courts of 
law."70 Would not then the relations and dynamics of the federal executive, not 
to mention the federal judiciary, change substantially, if to obtain a position 
working for the Energy Department or the Army, one had to be appointed by a 
judge? Certainly, the judiciary would have far greater power over the 
69. Special thanks to Jerry Mashaw for suggesting this example. 
70. U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[B]ut the Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."). 
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administration of law, indeed over the entire federal government, if it could 
appoint a significant portion of those people who worked for the President 
(arguably far more power than that under the judiciary's Article HI review of 
administrative cases). Who would the "courts of law" appoint, after all, as an 
assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or as an inferior officer in the Department 
of Health and Human Services? Former judges, prominent lawyers, friends of 
the judiciary? Surely, incentives and relations, rather than the "function" of 
appointment, explains why Congress rarely grants judges the power to appoint 
lesser officers in the executive branch. 
It is one thing to say that shifting power amounts to shifting political 
relations between the governed and the governing. It is another to determine the 
kind of risks entailed in such shifts. Indeed, one of the great problems of the 
doctrines of separated powers and federalism has been the dispute about their 
aims. Are these doctrines aimed at protecting individuals?71 Are they aimed at 
protecting "traditional" allocations of authority?72 Are they aimed at protecting 
some other "value" such as balance or impartiality or unity or efficiency?73 
Each of these aims seems to me to have some plausibility but each fails to 
provide much of a predictive tool for measuring structural risk. 
My approach eschews a search for the "values" of our constitutional 
structure; it considers, instead, constitutional structure as a dynamic process 
channelling political voice, in an interplay that seeks only to avoid the perils of 
a form of government in which the voices of the many are too strong or the 
voices of the few are too weak. It seems to me that we can all agree that a 
government in which the few rule is a form of aristocracy and that a 
government in which the many oppress the few yields a form of tyranny; we 
can also agree that both of these imagined ends pose grave risks to a republican 
form of government.74 These were, after all, the fears with which the Framers 
wrestled. These are the risks to which we should today attend. They are not 
risks encompassed in descriptive failures (in whether this is really "commerce" 
or really "economic" or really "executive") but in relations between the people 
and their government.75 
71. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 27 (arguing that the separation of powers serves to 
protect individual liberty). 
72. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, If Angels Were to Govern: The 
Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991). 
73. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. 
Rev. 421, 433-37 (1987) (listing various values sought to be promoted by the separation of 
powers, including limited government, containment of factions, and reducing conflicts of 
interest); see also Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 317 (1997) 
(discussing various values of federalism). 
74. Note that I never use the term "democracy" in this paper because the term is simply 
full of normative confusions. On this idea, see Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 
20 CardozoL. Rev. 795 (1999). 
75. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 39, at 251 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 
1961): 
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The texts describing vertical relations are important for what they do as 
much as what they mean, for the incentives they generate as much as the 
precise dictionary definitions they invoke. From changes in these relations and 
incentives (from shifts between representational ties to the people) we may 
make a set of pragmatic inferences: inferences that aim to predict the stakes of 
shifting governmental decisionmakers, where the stakes involve real life 
majorities and minorities. We must ask whether any particular structural 
innovation risks serious changes in our form of government, where by "form," I 
mean representational form as a republic. What is an aristocracy, after all, but a 
government in which the few rule the many; what is the tyranny of the mob but 
a government in which the many oppress the few? Put in other words, for any 
particular structural innovation, we must identify the baseline relations that 
govern, how those relations change with the proposal, and what the new 
relations and incentives mean for risks to majorities and minorities. 
This approach, however contrary to traditional views of constitutional 
structure (in particular the judiciocentric view), finds substantial support in 
more general understandings of constitutional politics, understandings ancient 
and modern. One can find concern for risks to majorities and minorities not 
only in a modern day article on institutional economics, but also in Madison's 
infamous tenth essay of The Federalist. The first risk, and the one most easily 
seen in the context of constitutional law generally, is the risk that a majority 
poses to a minority.76 Madison and the founding generation more generally 
were quite concerned with majorities that acted as a "faction," (where a 
majority faction is a group united by a common interest or passion committing 
unjust violations of the rights and interests of the minority, or of individuals, so 
that they may further their own majoritarian interests). Today, we tend to be 
familiar with this risk in constitutional law because of its emphasis in the 
"rights" area, where the work of John Hart Ely has had its most pronounced 
influence.77 The second risk runs in just the opposite direction - the possibility 
that minorities will oppress majorities, that the few will oppress the many.78 
[W]e may define a republic to be ... a government which derives all its powers directly or 
indirectly from the great body of the people .... It is essential to such a government that it 
be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a 
favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a 
delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their 
government the honorable title of republic. 
76. As James Madison put it: "Complaints are every where heard . . . that our 
governments are too unstable . . . and that measures are too often decided not according to 
the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested 
and overbearing majority." The Federalist No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke 
ed., 1961); see also id. at 60-61 ("When a majority is included in a faction, the form of 
popular government . . . enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public 
good and the rights of other citizens."). 
77. See Ely, supra note 3, at 73-104 (emphasizing the ways in which majorities may 
"tyrannize" minorities). 
78. "By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority 
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The Founders were acutely aware of this risk because this was the risk they 
associated with "aristocracy."79 Today, public choice scholarship has made 
clear how small, highly concentrated minorities may wield power 
disproportionate to the voting strength of their members. By virtue of the 
relative ease of organization, and lower transaction costs, small groups may in 
fact come to dominate large, relatively more dispersed, majorities.80 If these 
risks are generalized, they become more than risks, but changes in the "form" 
of government - rule by the "few" or the "mob."81 
If this is right, then the question in structural controversies - whether they 
be controversies about federalism or separated powers - should be the same. 
The question should be whether the proposed structural innovation yields 
or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community." The Federalist No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) 
(Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis added). 
79. See, e.g., Brutus, No. Ill, N.Y. J., Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in Creating the 
Constitution: Documents, supra note 45, at 159 (arguing against the Constitution that 
"[i]t will literally be a government in the hands of the few to oppress and plunder the 
many"); IX The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: 
Ratification by the States: Virginia, supra note 45, at 1376 (statement of Mr. Mason) 
(criticizing the "marriage" of the Senate and the President effected by the constitution: "We 
know the advantage that the few have over the many. . . . They may scheme and plot against 
the people without any chance of detection."). On the role of aristocracy in debates over 
constitutional provisions, see Wood, supra note 49, at 484-85 ("Both the proponents and 
opponents of the Constitution focused throughout the debates on an essential point of 
political sociology that ultimately must be used to distinguish a Federalist from an 
Antifederalist. The quarrel was fundamentally one between aristocracy and democracy."); id. 
at 488 ("Nothing was more characteristic of Antifederalist thinking than this obsession with 
aristocracy."). 
80. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and The 
Theory of Group 5-64 (1971) (emphasizing the power of small groups: "[t]he greater 
effectiveness of relatively small groups - the "privileged" and "intermediate" groups - is 
evident from observation and experience as well as from theory . . . .") This greater 
effectiveness is a power which corresponds to the risk of the "few," as I am using that term 
here. James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 112 (1962) (discussing the various 
decisionmaking costs of organizing groups, and the detrimental effect of the costs on the 
construction of a majority in a larger group). For recent work casting doubt on the 
universality of the Olson principle that small groups are always more effective, see Joan 
Esteban & Debraj Ray, Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 662,663-72(2001). 
81. I rely heavily here on the institutional economics of Neil Komesar who has 
developed a two-force model of politics. See Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: 
Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, ch. 3 ( 1 994) (describing 
the two-force model of politics, which depends upon risks both to majorities and minorities). 
This model refuses to view government as always or never virtuous, but considers the far 
more moderate and plausible claim that sometimes governments do, and sometimes they do 
not, reflect majority will. This moderation obviously flies in the face of both the extreme 
pessimism of public choice scholarship and the extreme optimism of the pluralist or 
deliberative democracy models. 
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substantial increased risks to majorities and minorities. This view finds support 
not only in historical, but also modern understandings of politics. A focus on 
incentive and institutional relation is the stuff of positive political theory and 
institutional economics. Neither an economic theory of the Constitution and its 
institutional structure, nor one focused on the positive political effects of 
institutions, can ignore the incentives created by the document. By focusing on 
the relations between the governed and governing, I am trying to put 
institutional incentives at center stage - for it is those incentives from which we 
may make predictions of future structural risk.82 
If this is right, it is right because, at least in part, it challenges what law has 
assumed to be the nature of power (as a set of generic activity descriptions) and 
suggests that there is something more to be considered. The idea that I am 
pursuing here is that courts' traditional vision of power as activity-description 
is incomplete; that the constitutional text itself tells us that the power created by 
the document inheres in something more than activity or function.83 The 
document itself tells us that the power it creates is not only a set of words but 
also a set of practiced relations between the governed and the governing. These 
constitutive relations (typically referred to as representation) should be more 
important to contemporary structural theory if for no other reason than that they 
live - every time someone votes, every time a person criticizes his or her 
congressman, every time a man or woman pickets the White House.84 
In what follows then, we will imagine power built not from dictionaries, 
but from the people. We will imagine that the doctrines of separated powers 
and federalism aim not only to describe our government but also to constitute 
relations between the people and their government. From this vantage point, 
when we look at questions of structural innovation our focus shifts from what is 
being done to who is doing it (where the "who" is a relation between the 
governed and the governing). If we move a decision from Congress to the 
Court we have not only moved an activity, we have moved a decisionmaker (a 
decisionmaker whose incentives are governed by a particular relation to the 
people). For example, a shift from Congress to the Supreme Court means that a 
decision once governed by the representation of locally aggregated 
constituencies (states and districts) will now be governed by no constituency at 
82. For further discussion of the relevance of political economy to this model, see infra 
Part IV.B. 
83. For a demonstration of this, see supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text. 
84. I believe Charles Black relied upon this notion of relation at least as much as on the 
more general notion of structure. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and 
Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969). This notion of relation is rather an ancient 
idea. See, e.g., Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 7 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn 
Miller & Harold Samuel Stone eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) (describing the 
laws of "political right" as those governing the "relation between those who govern and 
those who are governed," and the notion of "civil right" as between the governed 
themselves). 
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all. This, in turn, raises particular kinds of risks, risks to majorities which may, 
in turn, create risks to our form of government. We do not want the Supreme 
Court ordering the Marines to deploy because we fear that the Court will go to 
war without the support or will of the people. And we do not want the Court to 
go to war without the consent of the people because this risks changing our 
form of government - toward rule by the judicial few. 
In actual cases, of course, the relational calculus may be far more complex. 
This story will require that we keep simultaneous hold of risks that might 
otherwise appear conflicting (risks we conventionally conflate by using terms 
like "politics" and the "rule of law").85 If, for example, we were to move tort 
litigation from the courts to Congress, we would not worry that majorities were 
being ill represented, rather, we would worry that minorities and/or individuals' 
rights were at risk. More importantly, however, both risks might arise in any 
particular case. This is particularly true in any case in which an activity is 
shifted from the President to Congress or from Congress to the President. 
Indeed, it will become clear that this is the source of much confusion generated 
by the traditional approach where the issue is a conflict between the President 
and Congress. 
In what follows, I consider some of the more controversial structural 
decisions of the past. Although the cases are well-worn territory, the analysis is 
not. Indeed, it is precisely because the cases are well-worn, that I believe we 
can best see the relative advantages of an unfamiliar recourse to the constitutive 
relations created by the constitutional text. 
II. Separation of Powers 
I begin with a classic separation of powers "category" problem. My aim is 
to show how and why a constitutive view of the Constitution may help to 
relieve the pressures of categorical homogeneity implicit in conventional 
judiciocentric approaches. This brings me to consider the interplay between the 
separation of powers and what I will call "implied federalism," a first step in 
elaborating the intersections of horizontal and vertical constitutional structure. 
A. Categorical Conflict and Embedded Relations 
INS v. Chadhase is one of the chestnuts of separation of powers law, a case 
85. The "rule of law" is an ancient concept which harbors rather contrary meanings. 
On the one hand it is invoked as a reason for the law to restrain majorities; on the other hand, 
it is invoked as a reason to defer to majorities. In such a case, the "rule of law" poses the 
problem, it does not answer it. On the rule of law generally, see Paul W. Kahn, The Reign 
of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America 10 (1997) (noting that 
the Supreme Court's claim to act in the name of the rule of law "does not reflect a fact; it 
states an ambition, a point from which it will enter a contest of political meaning"). 
86. 462 U.S. 919(1983). 
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as famous for its overruling of hundreds of statutes as for its obvious 
categorical riddles. The Court's opinions striking down the legislative veto 
yielded no less than three very different categorical descriptions of the 
legislative veto. For Chief Justice Burger, the veto was obviously legislative. 
For Justice Powell, it was adjudicative. And for Justice White, who rejected the 
majority and concurring opinions as wildly formalistic, the veto was simply 
another conditional delegation of power to the executive branch to exercise 
"quasilegislative" powers.87 
As if this were not enough, the majority opinion seemed to adopt a 
definition of "legislative" power that was overly broad at best and potentially 
destructive at worst. The holding of the case was that the legislative veto 
violated the Constitution's Bicameralism and Presentment Clause. To reach 
that conclusion, the majority believed that it had to categorize the veto as 
"legislative" in character.88 But, in making that categorical determination, the 
Court invoked a definition that was highly problematic, finding that any action 
that "had the purpose and effect of altering legal rights, duties, and relations of 
persons," was legislative in nature.89 That definition almost immediately raised 
questions: questions about whether courts (which decide "legal rights") 
somehow violate the bicameralism clause, and, more importantly, whether 
administrative agencies that "legislate" rules and regulations without 
bicameralism are unconstitutional.90 Exacerbating the problem, the Court tried 
to ameliorate such conflicts by suggesting that the decision to deport Chadha 
was "legislative" in character when exercised by Congress and yet was 
"executive" in nature when exercised by the Justice Department.91 Not 
surprisingly, commentators tended to be mystified by Chadha and its 
categories.92 The continued invocation of these categorical dilemmas is 
87. See id. at 952 (Burger, J.) (characterizing the legislative veto as "essentially 
legislative in purpose and effect"); id. at 960, 964 (Powell, J., concurring) (characterizing the 
legislative veto in Chadha as prima facie "adjudicatory" action); id. at 986, 989 (White, J., 
dissenting) (characterizing the legislative veto as a retained legislative check on a grant of 
quasilegislative power to an executive agency, similar to Congress' broad power to delegate 
legislative authority to executive agencies). 
88. "Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an exercise of 
legislative power depends not on their form but upon 'whether they contain matter which is 
properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect.'" Id. at 952 (quoting S. Rep. 
No. 54-1335, at 8 (1897)). 
89. Id. 
90. Congress' lawyers argued that if the veto was legislative in character, then the 
Attorney General's initial action was also legislative, raising constitutional questions about 
whether administrative agency action was constitutionally possible without violating the 
Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses. See id. at 952 n.16. 
91. See id. (acknowledging that "some administrative agency action - rulemaking, for 
example, may resemble 'lawmaking,' ... but that when the Attorney General performs his 
duties pursuant to § 244, he does not exercise 'legislative' power," and therefore is not 
required to satisfy the bicameralism requirement) (internal citations omitted). 
92. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 
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evidence of what Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn have called Chadha's 
"wooden formalism."93 
Looking at the case as one about shifting relations, as opposed to one about 
texts, may help to illuminate the constitutive risks of the legislative veto. But to 
get there, one must understand a few things about the functional categories 
themselves. The categories of adjudication, legislation, and execution tend 
toward the essentialist; they imply a descriptive homogeneity that we know to 
be false in fact. It is a staple of the literature on constitutional structure that all 
of the departments can be found "functioning" in ways that look like the 
appropriate functions of other departments.94 What is often missed in this is 
that the Constitution's own text, for example, provides evidence contrary to 
functional discreteness (and indeed this was known to Madison and the 
founding generation).95 For example, the "legislative" power may be vested in 
the Congress but the Senate's powers clearly include "adjudicative" activity 
(Senate impeachment trials) and "executive" activity (confirming 
appointments).96 Most importantly, the "executive" power is vested in a 
President but the President is granted "legislative" power (the "veto").97 Since 
there is no unique functional/activity description enumerated by the text itself it 
should be no surprise that attempts to apply such a descriptive approach should 
fail - both in a textual and a realist sense. 
80 Geo. L.J. 523, 523-26 (1992) (noting a variety of inconsistencies between Chadha and 
other decisions depending upon a definition of "lawmaking"). 
93. See id. at 527 ("Chadha assumes a wooden and unnecessarily formalist operation 
of bicameralism and presentment, as simply hoops that bills must jump through before they 
become law."). 
94. See Peter Strauss, Comment: Was There A Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on 
the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 789. 
95. The President's veto power appears in Article I (the article vesting "legislative" 
power), not Article II (the article vesting "executive" power). It was feared, for example, that 
the veto power would allow the President to "legislate"; similarly, there was worry that the 
appointment and treaty powers of the Senate, when joined with the powers of the President, 
made the departments less than "separate and distinct." See, e.g., The Federalist No. 47, at 
328 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that state constitutions blended 
powers and using as an example of blended or mixed power the executive veto); The 
Federalist No. 51, at 350 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) (defending the 
"qualified connection" between the Senate and the President in appointments and treaty 
making); see also 1 Federalists and Antifederalists: The Debate Over the 
Ratification of the Constitution 68 (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1989) 
("The combination of the Senate and President in appointments and treaty-making was 
denounced [by the Antifederalists] as a violation of the principle of separation of powers."). 
96. U.S. Const, art. I, § 3 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments."); U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing the Senate's "advice and consent" 
power in the article on "executive" power). 
97. See U.S. Const, art. I, §§ 1,7 (vesting "legislative power" and providing for the 
executive's veto: "Every bill . . . shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President 
of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it with his 
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall . . . proceed to 
reconsider it."). 
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Accounts of constitutional structure that depend upon governmental 
function not only generate a bad descriptive account of the Constitution, they 
also fail to predict what we know to be real shifts in power. I can easily 
perform an intellectual experiment in which I hold function constant but can 
make mincemeat of the balance of power of our current form of government. 
Just have the House elect the Senate and see what happens to the Presidency; 
the departments are still "doing" the same things and performing the same 
"functions," but the "balance" of power changes dramatically. With a Senate 
beholden to House members, we have a far more unified legislative body and 
thus a far greater threat to the President.98 Function alone cannot predict 
significant changes in constitutional structure. Perhaps more importantly, 
functional labels are not only descriptively impoverished but also are often 
normatively confused. For example, sometimes, when we call something 
"adjudication," we mean "good, that is what a court should do to restrain 
majorities"; but sometimes when we call something "adjudication," we mean 
precisely the opposite, "good, that is what a court should do to legitimate or 
defer to majorities." Thus, it is possible that when we say that something is 
"adjudication," we are already implicitly defining what that "function is" by 
reference to an unacknowledged offstage, and potentially conflicting, 
moralization. 
If we move beyond the question of functional activity toward vertical 
relation and constituency, we tend to reduce potential descriptive conflicts for 
no other reason than that electoral methods are not fungible across the 
departments. Congressmen are elected in particular ways and those ways are 
not repeated in the selection of the President or members of the Supreme Court. 
At the same time, however, this approach adds considerable flexibility in our 
accounts because it permits us to see the possibility that the functional/activity 
categories are really crude proxies for different and even conflicting 
governance risks. Put in other words, once one gives up on the 
categorical/descriptive ideal, it is possible to see that there are very different 
risks to the people posed by the legislative veto in Chada. 
Let us begin with the easiest risk to see: the risk to popular majorities. Had 
Congress sought to deport Chadha on its own, it would have had to pass a bill 
through the House, the Senate, and have it signed by the President. In Chadha, 
the Supreme Court's majority repeated this fact over and over again but did 
little to explain how this related to the meaning of bicameralism." From a 
98. For a more complete analysis of this, see Nourse, Vertical Separation, supra note 
37, at 761-63. 
99. "The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal 
Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as 
nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned 
responsibility." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); see also id. at 944 ("[T]he fact 
that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of 
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution."). 
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vertical perspective, however, there is more to bicameralism than meets the 
eye, particularly if one cares about the relations between the people and their 
government. Imagine a law providing that only Arizona would, in the future, 
decide budgetary questions for the nation. Our concern about such a proposal is 
not about function: The reasons that we think such proposals are 
unconstitutional has very little to do with whether the members from Arizona 
are legislating or executing or adjudicating. We fear such a proposal because 
there is a distinct risk to popular majorities'. Would we really want nationally 
important decisions to be made only by a few states or districts? What better 
way to create an elective aristocracy? 
It is no answer to this to say that, in Chadha, there was full representation 
because there was a vote by the entire House of Representatives. A one-house 
veto may cover the nation geographically but still presents risks of partial 
constitutional representation, because the Constitution demands the agreement 
of two different forms of constituency, one reflected in the Senate and the other 
in the House.100 Decisions by the House alone, and thus by population alone, 
will tend to reflect the majoritarian preferences of the larger population centers; 
by contrast, a decision by the Senate alone will tend to prefer the smaller states. 
As a general rule, then, congressional action requires bicameralism not for 
some reason-without-reason but because of vertical, representational 
concerns - that congressional decisions should be representationally redundant 
(that they satisfy the majoritarian preferences of both larger and smaller 
aggregations of voters).101 Some may question whether that mix of interests 
favors the few,102 but it is unquestionably a representative structure that the 
bicameralism requirement seeks to enforce. 
This understanding does a better job not only of giving popular meaning to 
100. Although wrapped in the rhetoric of function, the majority opinion does in fact 
refer to this representational history: 
[T]he Framers were also concerned, although not of one mind, over the apprehensions of the 
smaller states. Those states feared a commonality of interest among the larger states would 
work to their disadvantage; representatives of the larger states, on the other hand, were 
skeptical of a legislature that could pass laws favoring a minority of the people. ... It need 
hardly be repeated here that the Great Compromise, under which one House was viewed as 
representing the people and the other the states, allayed the fears of both the large and small 
states. We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral 
requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions. 
Id. at 950-51 (citations omitted). 
101. "The Framers admired the legitimacy of popular republican decisionmaking, but 
rejected systems of lawmaking by simple majority votes, either in the form of direct 
democracy or of a unicameral parliamentary system ... ." Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 
92, at 528. The point was to retard "factional" legislation at the same time as creating 
multiple sites for the reflection of majoritarian sentiment. 
102. It is widely known that the structure of the Senate allows a minority of the 
population (in some cases a very small minority), to veto legislation. See Lynn Baker & 
Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone, 13 J.L. & POL. 21 
(1997). The Senate's structure and internal rules require, in effect, a significant 
supermajority before any piece of legislation even reaches the desk of the President. 
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the Chadha Court's apparent formalistic reliance on the bicameralism clause, 
but also limits the Court's rationale in ways that the categorical model does 
not.103 To say that Congress needs to act with the full complement of the 
people's representatives (state and local, House and Senate) says absolutely 
nothing about what distinguishes legislation from execution in some abstract 
dictionary sense. As a result, such a determination does not require any agency 
or department, other than Congress, to satisfy bicameralism requirements. (One 
wonders, of course, how an administrative agency could ever satisfy such a 
requirement: Would it have to convene "two houses" of the agency?). 
Similarly, the focus on the vertical relation tends to alleviate any apparent 
inconsistency between the decision to deport Chadha as "legislative" in 
Congress but "executive" when determined by the Justice Department. One 
need not characterize the decision to deport as legislative or executive, to 
conclude that, when Congress acts, it must act in ways that are consistent with 
the representational demands of the Constitution. 
B. Change, Baselines, and Relative Shifts in Power 
Now consider Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Chada: He concludes 
that the legislative veto was neither legislative nor executive, but, instead, 
adjudicative.104 From the perspective of the typical "matching game" story, 
this seems to be quite incompatible with the majority's views.105 A function 
that is legislative one moment cannot suddenly be transformed into a function 
that is adjudicative the next. If I am right, however, there may be nothing 
inconsistent in the Burger and Powell opinions: Both may simply raise different 
risks to the people. 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion assumes that the category "legislation" is a 
proxy for a feared risk to majorities (a fear of "partial representation" of the 
whole); for Justice Powell, the category "adjudication" serves as a proxy for a 
different fear - a risk to the few. As a general rule, Congress may not and does 
not decide individual cases, as Justice Powell noted. There are good reasons for 
this; the fear is that such a power, in the hands of a representative body, poses 
103. If, after Chadha, all "lawmaking" must be subject to the bicameralism 
requirement, then questions arise whether, for example, Congress' delegation of lawmaking 
authority to the Comptroller General violated the bicameralism requirement in Bowsher. For 
this and other questions based on Chadha 's equation of "lawmaking" with bicameralism, see 
generally Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 92, at 524-26; id. at 526 ("Chadha's conceptual 
framework is in tension with the results or the reasoning of the Court's practice in other 
areas: it is strikingly inconsistent with Dames & Moore; arguably inconsistent with Alaska 
Airlines, Mistretta, Chevron, and the Court's frequent endorsements of legislative history; 
and suggests a different analysis than that followed by the Court in Bowsher."). 
104. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958 n.22 ("Justice Powell's position is that the one- 
House veto in this case is & judicial act ... ."). 
105. See id. (rejecting this view: "[T]he attempted analogy between judicial action and 
the one-House veto is less than perfect."). 
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grave risks to individuals and minorities.106 A Congress that adjudicates will be 
a Congress that protects favorites and punishes scapegoats. Chadha, who the 
Justice Department had ruled should stay, had been handpicked out of 
hundreds107 to have his case reversed by the head of a subcommittee whose 
judgment appeared to have been rubberstamped.108 Justice Powell was 
concerned lest the decision represent the kind of unfairness that the 
Constitution aims specifically to prevent through the Bill of Attainder clause - 
trial by legislature.109 
Viewed in this light, the Powell and Burger opinions do not conflict, even 
if their descriptive, functional, judgments do. The reason is that the risks to 
representation implicit in the functional judgments are quite different (indeed, 
they are the opposite risks). This is due, in large part, to the fact that the 
opinions conceive of the shift in constitutive relations quite differently. The 
majority opinion appeared to worry about a shift from a full Congress to a 
partial Congress - and thus struck the statute down based on a shift of political 
power from the many to the few. Justice Powell's concurring opinion saw the 
case differently, as a shift from a relatively insulated executive branch 
employee (or even a judge) to members of Congress. The risk was not to 
majorities but to minorities. Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger thus do not 
see the same risk, but both do see significant constitutional risks from the 
legislative veto, one for Chadha, the other for the rest of us. 
106. See id. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring) ("In deciding whether Chadha deserves to 
be deported, Congress is not subject to any internal constraints that prevent it from arbitrarily 
depriving him of the right to remain in this country. Unlike the judiciary or an administrative 
agency, Congress is not bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the 
procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, 
that are present when a court or an agency adjudicates individual rights."). 
107. "In addition to the report on Chadha, Congress had before it the names of 339 
other persons whose deportations also had been suspended by the Service." Id. at 964. 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
108. According to Justice Powell, the "normal procedures" for considering resolutions 
were not complied with in Chadha' s case. Id. at 964 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring). In the case 
of Chadha' s bill, the simple resolution "was not distributed prior to the vote, but the 
Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration . . . explained . . . [that] it was the 
feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases, that the aliens contained in the 
resolution did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship 
Id. at 964 (Powell, J., concurring). The majority's opinion notes that in a prior veto bill, 
Representative Eilberg appeared to make the claim that he had "worked" with the Attorney 
General's office on the "vetoes," thus suggesting to the members present that the veto was 
not controversial. See id. at 927 n.3. 
109. As Justice Powell explained: 
[The Framers'] concern that a legislature should not be able unilaterally to impose a 
substantial deprivation on one person was expressed not only in this general allocation of 
power, but also in more specific provisions, such as the Bill of Attainder Clause, Art. I, § 9, 
cl. 3. As the Court recognized in United States v. Brown . . . "the Bill of Attainder Clause 
was intended . . . [as] a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, 
or more simply - trial by legislature." 
Id. at 962 (Powell, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
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Viewing Chada in this way highlights the possibility that the problem with 
Chadha is not that the categories conflict but that the risks are overdetermined: 
that there is more than one risk from the legislative veto. This can only be seen, 
however, if one focuses attention on change rather than stasis, shifts in relations 
rather than essentialist functions. It is this aspect of the relational analysis that 
differs from the traditional "matching game" we know as categorical analysis. 
Focusing on shifting stakes to the people reveals that which categorical 
analyses seek to hide - it makes the question of the appropriate "baseline" quite 
explicit and realistic. What we should want to know in structural cases is what 
effect structural innovations will have on the people - whether our government 
will veer too far toward a rule of aristocrats or tyrants. To focus on change and 
shifting power is to make explicit one's starting point in a way that categorical 
analyses seem to defy or at least obscure. The "matching game" offers a static, 
essentialist inquiry, the activity always "is" or "is not" some "function." A 
constitutive analysis mediates this essentialism not only by shifting to a notion 
of risk (which does not "locate" a power in any geographic space or 
bureaucratic essence), but also asks about the dynamic movements of power 
"from" and "to." 
The Burger and Powell opinions perceived different risks, one to 
majorities, the other to minorities. This reflects decidedly different "baseline" 
judgments. Justice Powell viewed as the appropriate baseline the decision of 
individual cases by independent decisionmakers;110 Chief Justice Burger 
viewed the baseline as a full-dress Congress.111 Relative to the decision of the 
full Congress and the President, the decision by Representative Eilberg's 
subcommittee to deport Chadha was less likely to reflect majoritarian concerns; 
but relative to a decision by a court or independent decisionmaker, that very 
same decision was more likely to increase majoritarian influence to the 
detriment of individuals. There is, in the end, a common sense to this. To put it 
simply, Representative Eilberg was more than a judge but less than the 
Congress. He was a politicized decisionmaker, not an independent one, 
deciding the fate of an individual; and yet, at the same time, his district had no 
right to speak for the nation, for Congress and for the President. It is in this 
sense that the risks to majorities and minorities identified by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Powell may both exist, even if the categorical proxies for 
those judgments appear to contradict each other. 
110. See, e.g., id. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Unlike the judiciary or an 
administrative agency, Congress is not bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it 
subject to the procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an 
impartial tribunal."). 
111. See, e.g., id. at 958 ("To accomplish what has been attempted by one House of 
Congress in this case requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the 
Constitution's prescription for legislative action; passage by a majority of both Houses and 
presentment to the President."). 
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C. Implied Federalism and the Separation of Powers 
There will be those who will find this story incomplete or unacceptable 
because it offends a rather conventional account of Chadha - one which rejects 
the Court's opinion as both formalistic and unpalatable. The debate about 
Chadha has been and continues to be focused on whether Congress should use 
the legislative veto to "control" broad delegations of lawmaking power to 
administrative agencies. In this vein, the legislative veto has been seen as a 
"workable" or "fresh" check on runaway agencies.112 
All of this, however, tends to begin from the baseline presumption 
embedded in the notion of "lawmaking." The argument's assumption is that 
"lawmaking" authority is somehow improperly in the hands of the agency and 
therefore the proper, accountable authority (Congress) needs to be put back "in 
charge." To say, at the start, that one is moving "lawmaking" authority to the 
agencies is to run the risk of begging the question (that one means by 
"lawmaking" actually "congressional awmaking"). After all, as Jerry Mashaw 
has pointed out, the President is an elected official too - and when Congress 
grants power to agencies, it does not send its missives into space or to 
judges;113 it sends them to the President, an official responsive to an electoral 
audience, albeit one that is differently constituted than the congressional 
electorate. All of this simply supports the view that I have been taking - that 
the shift of decisionmaker to administrative agencies is not the transfer of a 
particular kind of power (lawmaking or executive or adjudicative) but, instead, 
is a shift of relations to the public. To see more clearly how this model works 
and what it reveals about the conventional story of Chadha, let us turn to 
112. The term "fresh check" hails from Professor Stephen Carter. See, e.g., Carter, 
supra note 24, at 746. For a powerful game-theoretic argument that the legislative veto may 
be a wise use of congressional power to check administrative agencies, see Eskridge & 
Ferejohn, supra note 92, at 540-43. One must note that the "fresh check" theory, however 
elegantly expressed, and whether important in the context of agency decisionmaking, has not 
appeared so attractive outside of this context. It is the growing consensus, for example, that 
"fresh checks," like the Independent Counsel and the Sentencing Commission, may raise 
rather serious constitutional questions. 
113. "If this description of voting in national elections is reasonably plausible, then the 
utilization of vague delegations to administrative agencies takes on significance as a device 
for facilitating responsiveness to voter preferences expressed in presidential elections." 
Jerry Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve 
Public Law 152 (1997) (emphasis added). As Mashaw argues, delegation may actually 
"improv[e] the responsiveness of government to the desires of the general electorate." Id. at 
153. Moreover, Mashaw adds: 
If congressional statutes were truly specific with respect to the actions that administrators 
were to take, presidential politics would be a mere beauty contest. . . . [S]pecific statutes 
would mean that presidents and administrations could respond to voter preferences only if 
they were able to convince the legislature to make specific changes in the existing set of 
specific statutes. Arguments for specific statutory provisions constraining administrative 
discretion may therefore reflect a desire merely for conservative, not responsive, governance. 
Id 
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Justice White's dissent, in which the "fresh check" claim seems to find its 
natural home. 
We have already seen Chief Justice Burger's focus on the shift from a full 
Congress to a partial Congress and Justice Powell's focus on a shift from an 
independent decisionmaker to a politicized one. There is as well another shift 
that must be considered. For Justice White, the important shift was not at the 
time Congress decided Chadha's fate but, rather, when it reserved part of the 
delegated power from Congress to the Executive to decide immigration 
matters. It is this temporal framing of the case to which I now turn so that we 
may see how many separation of powers cases carry a dimension of what I will 
call (for lack of a better term) "implied federalism." (Later, we will see the 
more obvious incarnation of "implied" separation of powers concerns in 
federalism cases.) It is here that the case takes a turn away from the nature of 
the legislative veto, toward the President's veto. 
In considering power shifts from Congress to the President and vice versa, 
it seems obvious but is worth remembering that the representational or vertical 
structure of the American legislature and the American presidency are not the 
same. As noted above, standard kinds of structural analyses tend to plunk both 
departments in the "politics" camp without recognizing the different incentives 
and structures in these institutions.114 Indeed, anyone who watches television 
on the night of Presidential elections is likely to know that the way in which 
votes are aggregated geographically matters not only to outcomes but to the 
incentives of the particular players. The Congress and the President both 
represent national majorities, but they represent them differently - and that is 
because members of Congress represent more fragmented and localized 
constituencies.115 
One way in which the Congress and the President represent the nation 
differently is that members of Congress speak to a much smaller constituency. 
Senators speak to state-aggregated constituencies, and House members speak to 
district-aggregated constituencies. It is this dimension that serves as a principal 
difference between the representative institutions of our federal government. 
The President does not represent the Third District of Connecticut or the state 
of Alaska; he represents the nation, just as it is also true that the Senator from 
Oklahoma does not represent the nation. This yields an "implied" federalism 
component to the separation of powers because any shift from the Congress to 
the President or vice versa is likely to involve a relative shift away or to state 
and locally aggregated electorates (albeit at the national level). 
1 14. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 3, at ch.l (referring to the different constituencies of 
the President and the Congress but emphasizing the court's similar role with respect to each); 
David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the 
People Through Delegation (1993). 
115. A 51% majority may lead to a Presidential policy, for example, that will never 
pass Congress because of the geographical concentration of the 51% of the population. 
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This "implied federalism" dimension of national structure is, of course, 
well known in federalism scholarship1 16 and was well known, indeed crucial, to 
the adoption of the Constitution;117 here, however, we consider it in a rather 
different place - the separation of powers. Lest there be confusion, my claim is 
not the traditional Wechslerian position that the Court need not review 
federalism cases because the states are in fact represented in the Congress.118 I 
am interested, here, in something different; I am interested in the separation of 
powers, the entire constitutional structure, where that structure is conceived of 
as separate forms of popular representation. In a sense, then, I am simply 
beginning with a truism: Members of Congress are elected in a different way 
from the President. And that way is distinguished by one body's reliance upon 
more local electorates. As Charles Black once put it, the member from the Fifth 
of Texas lives and breathes based on what they think of him in the Fifth of 
Texas.119 Add that up 535 times and one gets 535 states and localities; and that 
is the "implied federalism" dimension of the separation of powers. 
The actual representational picture is, of course, more complex120 and 
1 16. See, e.g., Weschler, supra note 25. 
117. Rakove, supra note 42, ch. 4 (discussing the ways in which questions of 
representation influenced the structure of the Congress, the Presidency, and their 
relationship). 
118. Briefly, here is my position on the Wechsler thesis: First, and foremost, I reject 
the notion that we can best determine questions of structure by looking at them initially as 
questions of "judicial review" - there is more at stake in this than the decisionmaking of 
courts. As for the Wechsler thesis, itself, however, I have stated before that I believe the 
Wechsler argument is unpersuasive in its given form but may ultimately have some 
resonance. Like Larry Kramer, I believe that there are important ways in which the electoral 
structure of the Senate does in fact link national and local politicians. See Kramer, 
Understanding, supra note 25, at 1523-29 (emphasizing the role of political parties in 
forming ties across planes of government). National politicians need votes in localities and 
so they find organizations that are capable of mobilizing those votes (whether those 
organizations are churches or unions or local party officials). As the political economists 
have told us, small groups are often better at catalyzing a majority than a broad-based appeal 
to the majority. The most notable difference between my position and the current contenders 
is my claim that state governments are to be protected under the constitution as a proxy for 
the interests of the people of the state; there is no independent constitutional interest in any 
particular form of state bureaucracy, other than the minimal condition that it be a 
"republican" form of government and the more substantive condition that it not violate 
federal constitutional guarantees. This does not mean that the federal government can 
interfere with the form of state governments at will; it means quite the opposite, namely, that 
the federal government should resist strongly any intervention in the form of state 
governments precisely because the choice of state structure reflects the deep structure of the 
people's wishes for self-governance. 
119. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political 
Departments, 1 Hastings CONST. L.Q. 13, 16-17 (1974). 
120. I refer here to changes in the election of Senators and to the fact that congressional 
districts are not constitutionally mandated. Neither of these complications, however, changes 
the relative calculus in the text. Even if all House members were elected by state-wide votes, 
and the Senate had no allegiance to state governments (as opposed to state voters), it would 
still be the case that the Congress would be at a relative advantage in reflecting the interests 
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subject to all of the regularly identified political pathologies. As I have said 
before, separation of powers doctrine cannot cure the government of all 
political pathologies, only particular structural pathologies.121 If the member 
from the Fifth forsakes his constituents, there is nothing that the separation of 
powers can do to rectify those failures. What constitutional structure may do is 
identify risks separate and apart from the standard agency risks. Thus, even if 
we were to assume the most gloomy view of electoral politics produced in the 
past twenty years, in which politicians regularly forsake majorities for 
minorities, it would still be the case that we should worry about the separation 
of powers - not because it could cure agency problems or eliminate special 
interests - but because it regulates relations between political institutions.122 
Regarding shifts from Congress to the President, and vice versa, the question 
remains whether a shift from a nationally aggregated constituency to a more 
locally aggregated one (and again vice versa) raises significant risks to our 
form of government. But to assess that we cannot begin assuming that because 
the President and the Congress are political entities, they somehow have the 
same representational incentives. As a general rule, the President has a more 
national focus and members of Congress a more local one. 
There will be those who will insist that this presumption does not always 
hold; the skeptic will note that, in any particular case, for example, our member 
from the Fifth may actually take a "national" position or the President may take 
a position that favors some states over others. Of course that is true. But a 
presumption is a presumption (rather than a rule) because its truth is subject to 
rebuttal. I am aiming to capture, not all of the incentives of any particular actor 
in the system, but a simple and thus predictive take on relative incentives, with 
emphasis on the term "relative." The point is not to reinvent the essentialist 
question in the elective nature of the Presidency or the Congress but, instead, to 
determine their relative structural incentives. And as a relative matter, it seems 
fair to conclude that the President has greater incentives to speak to the nation 
than the member from the Fifth of Texas. As Professor Mashaw tells us: "The 
President has no particular constituency to which he or she has special 
responsibility to deliver benefits .... [I]ssues of national scope and the 
candidates' positions on those issues are the essence of presidential 
policies."123 
of more local electorates than would the President. This holds true, moreover, even though 
there are links between the President and the states that are periodically forged by the 
demands of the electoral college since such links are far weaker than those between the 
"member from the Fifth" and the electorate of the Fifth, in part because of the difference 
between a two-year and a four-year election cycle and in part because of the contingency of 
voter distributions. 
121 . Nourse, Vertical Separation, supra note 37, at 786-87. 
122. Of course, if one thinks that all political decisions are always and inevitably 
corrupt or bought, just as if one thought they were all wise and pluralistic, there would be 
little to argue about. 
123. Mashaw, supra note 1 13, at 152. 
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If, as I have detailed, we view the departments as representing different 
constituencies, then it seems fair to conclude than any shift to Congress shifts 
decisions from an audience that is nationally dispersed to one whose wishes are 
more locally aggregated. Shifting in the opposite direction (taking a task or 
decision away from Congress and giving it to the President) raises precisely the 
opposite risk: reducing the relative power of state and locally aggregated 
constituencies. Put more colloquially, the question posed is whether the 
President and his "men" will be as responsive to local concerns as would be the 
Senate or the House or their combination (or whether the Senate and House 
will be as responsive to national majorities as is the President). 
In Chadha, both of these "implied federalism" risks were present at 
different points in the legislative process and this is what, in the end, separates 
the majority opinions from the dissent. Justice White, in his dissent, 
emphasized "time one," when the original immigration statute was passed, 
including the legislative veto. At that time, the relevant shift was from Congress 
to the executive (shifting decisionmaking power away from locally aggregated 
constituencies) to decide individual deportation matters.124 As Justice White 
makes clear, at time one, the statute's problems are similar to any other 
delegation of authority to the executive.125 And, on this question, he is certainly 
correct. The problem is that this does not answer the question at time two - 
when the legislative veto is exercised.126 At that time, the relevant shift is in 
124. The obvious implication of this is that "delegation" cases reflect "implied 
federalism" concerns, as I have defined them here. There is a common sense to this: One of 
the conventional complaints about the delegation of broad powers to the federal government 
is the claim that broad delegation takes power away from the states. Delegation doctrine, 
however, is generally not viewed as a federalism issue. 
125. If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and executive agencies, it 
is most difficult to understand Article I as forbidding Congress from also reserving a check 
on legislative power for itself. Absent the veto, the agencies receiving delegations of 
legislative or quasi-legislative power may issue regulations having the force of law without 
bicameral approval and without the President's signature. It is thus not apparent why the 
reservation of a veto over the exercise of that legislative power must be subject to a more 
exacting text. In both cases, it is enough that the initial statutory authorizations comply with 
the Article I requirements. 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 986-87 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
126. Justice White argues, for example, that the legislative veto does not undermine the 
separation of powers because it requires the agreement of all three departments: "[Section] 
244(c) (2) did not alter the division of actual authority between Congress and the 
Executive. . . . [A] permanent change in a deportable alien's status could be accomplished 
only with the agreement of the Attorney General, the House, and the Senate." Id. at 994 
(White, J., dissenting). In fact, the Attorney General did not agree to Chadha 's deportation 
and had the case ended with his decision, it would not have led to Chadha's deportation 
while, because the decision ended with the Congress, he was to be deported. White's 
argument based on "agreement" conflates the order in which the parties are to decide the 
matter. This is achieved in part by assuming a baseline of deportability and reconstituting the 
Attorney General's decision as a "proposal for legislation," and the Congress' decision as a 
failure to act on that proposal. See id. at 997. This act/omission framing issue does not 
change the ultimate order of decisionmaking which still (even if Congress is construed as 
"failing to act") ends with Congress. That gives priority in the individual decision to deport 
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precisely the opposite direction (shifting power from a nationally aggregated 
audience to a locally aggregated constituency).127 And that question involves 
more than delegation - indeed, it involves more than the Congress; it becomes 
one of the President's power to veto. 
If Congress had passed a traditional piece of legislation to deport Chadha, 
the President would have had the opportunity to veto it. But, with the 
legislative veto, at "time two," the President can do nothing. The skeptic will 
reply that the President already had his opportunity because his agent, the 
Department of Justice, had previously acted. But that inverts the traditional, 
temporal order of action under the Constitution. And temporality is relevant 
where the separation of powers is concerned, because it matters to popular 
representation. The Constitution is structured so that a national audience 
typically has the last say on a piece of legislation (subject to an override by a 
congressional supermajority). That structure has an impact on the relative 
power of constituencies. Just imagine that we eliminated the President's veto 
and you will see that this would shift significant power to the states and 
localities. (After all, it was one of the Anti-Federalists' objections during the 
ratification debates, that the President's veto would shift power to the nation 
and away from the states).128 From this perspective, the legislative veto is 
problematic because it shifts the "last say" away from the President and his 
national constituencies, toward the Congress and its state and locally 
aggregated audiences (without a supermajority). It is no answer to this to say, 
as Justice White did, that, at "time one," in the original passage of the Act, that 
the President acquiesced in such an arrangement. We would hardly say that the 
President and the Congress could agree anticipatorily to give away the veto, in 
part or in whole. 
The important point is not whether you are convinced by this argument that 
the Chadha statute must be judged at "time two." The important point for my 
purposes is to show how and why the question in Chadha comes down to one 
of "implied federalism." If one judges the case at "time one," when the original 
immigration statute was passed, then there is no question that the action 
appears like any other delegation; but if one judges it at "time two," then there 
is a significant question about whether state and locally aggregated 
constituencies have gotten "another bite at the apple" (one that they would not 
get typically unless they could gather a supermajority to override the 
President). 
to relatively more local constituencies and thus still risks parochialism. 
127. For example, return to our example of a Constitution without a presidential veto. 
It seems fairly easy to predict that if the Congress were to have the final word on legislation, 
such a system would increase the relative power of those whom Congress represents (state 
and local interests) relative to the power of the president's national constituency. See Nourse, 
Vertical Separation, supra note 37, at 765-66. 
128. See id. at 765 & n.57 (providing citations for sources documenting the Anti- 
Federalist perspective during the debates). 
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Many self-styled "liberals" have tended to find little troubling in the 
legislative veto and have excoriated the Supreme Court for applying a 
formalistic analysis. Yet, often times, it is these same "liberals" who worry 
about federalism; they view devolution to the states with some skepticism, 
skepticism inspired by the fear that state majorities will oppress minorities. 
Those two positions are inconsistent: If you worry about federalism (meant as 
devolution to the states), you should also worry about the legislative veto. And 
you should worry about it for the reasons that were so apparent in the case: that 
bodies aggregated by relatively more local constituencies - states and 
districts - are likely to be relatively more parochial than nations. Surely, this is 
what realism tells us about Representative Eilberg's decision to deport Mr. 
Chadha. Would you really want your personal claim to citizenship to depend 
upon the whims of a single congressional representative? 
III. Federalism 
So far, I have tried to show that the idea of function serves as a proxy, 
albeit a crude one in structural matters. Even though we might essentialize a 
government innovation as legislative, or judicial, or executive, we have seen 
that these characterizations may not in fact contradict each other. Indeed, they 
may reflect consistent judgments, albeit judgments not about function or 
activity but about risks to the decisionmaking relations between the people and 
their government. Here, I extend this analysis to more recent structural 
problems, problems typically denominated as questions of federalism. Just as in 
the separation of powers context, the relevant activity descriptions (the "local" 
and the "national") serve, in my view, as proxies for judgments about the kinds 
of electorates that we want to decide matters of institutional structure. Thus, the 
"truly local" and the "truly national"129 will be considered as different relations 
between citizens and their governments. 
The federalism debates begin, today, with the Supreme Court's decision in 
United States v. Lopez.130 Prior to Lopez, it was thought that the commerce 
power was virtually without limit.131 Congress could reach seemingly local 
activities if, by aggregating those local activities, there was a significant effect 
on interstate commerce.132 In Lopez, however, the Court held that the 
aggregation principle only applied to "economic" or "commercial" activities.133 
129. I am referring here to the terms used most recently by the Supreme Court in one 
of its more controversial federalism decisions. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
617(2000). 
130. 514 U.S. 549(1995). 
131. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 674, 685 (1995) 
("Before Lopez many academics and lower court judges speculated that the Commerce 
Clause no longer imposed any limits on congressional action."). 
132. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 1 1 1 (1942). 
133. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (interpreting prior cases, such as Wickard, as "upholding 
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The Court thus struck down Congress' attempt to regulate the "possession" of 
weapons within a certain radius of a school zone on the ground that this was a 
matter of crime, not commerce.134 
Lopez's solution to the problem of congressional aggrandizement - the 
embrace of a new category of "economic" or "commercial" activities - has 
already led to predictable descriptive difficulties.135 Like the traditional state 
function test before it, the Lopez standard leads to framing issues. If the 
"commercial" function test is applied at the most narrow, fact-bound level, then 
the growing of wheat in Wickard was not economic (planting and growing do 
not depend upon a national economy), nor the eating of food at Ollie's 
barbecue,136 nor sleeping at Atlanta Motel,131 nor even perhaps the sawing of a 
piece of wood in Darby.  Of course, in these cases, the court opened the 
"subject frame,"139 asking whether planting or dining or sleeping led to an 
economic effect - overhanging the market or restraining travel. But, might not 
the frame be widened "just a bit" in Lopez, wide enough to encompass the 
defendant's intended sale of the gun?140 As commentators have noted, subject 
regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, 
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce"). 
134. Id. ("Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those 
terms.") (internal citations omitted). 
135. For an incisive critique of the categorical approach, see Judith Resnik, 
Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the Globe, 1 1 1 Yale L.J. 619, 621 (2001) 
("[C]ategorical federalism ought to be understood as a political claim, advancing an 
argument that certain forms of human interactions should be governed by a particular 
locality, be it a nation-state or its subdivisions .... Categorical federalism' s attempt to 
buffer the states from the nation, and this nation from the globe, is faulty as a method and 
wrong as an aspiration."). For an amusing yet insightful one, see John Copeland Nagle, The 
Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MlCH. L. Rev. 174 (1998) 
(discussing problems of aggregation and similarity of activities in the context of an 
endangered species act question). 
136. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Congress' power under 
the Commerce Clause to enact Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a 
restaurant). 
137. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding 
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to enact Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 as applied to a hotel). 
138. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Congress' power under 
the Commerce Clause to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber 
manufactured by a Georgia company which paid its employees less than a minimum wage or 
required working more than a maximum of hours prescribed by law). 
139. I borrow the notion of framing from Mark Kelman and his idea of "time-framing." 
See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. 
Rev. 591 (1981). 
140. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995) (describing Lopez's testimony that he brought the gun to school so that he 
could deliver it after school to one "'Jason,' who planned to use it in a 'gang war,'" for 
which Lopez would receive "$40 for his services"). 
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framing may well cause problems in cases far afield from Morrison and Lopez 
- in cases of debt repayment and child pornography and the protection of 
endangered species.141 
However persuasive this critique, it is an ancient one, one that repeats the 
cautionary tale of the New Deal and of National League of Cities - a tale 
typically told as one about the vanities of categorical pretension. Nothing in the 
critique, however, addresses the animating fears of those attracted to the 
categories. At various points in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has 
predicted that, unless courts define the constitutional term "commerce," the 
states will suffer dire consequences and even be "obliterated."142 Of course, 
this is a deeply exaggerated position; as far as I last checked, the states did not 
disappear after the New Deal. Moreover, a single gun statute, however 
overbroad, is unlikely to change that. Yet, like many fears, this one is 
particularly revealing. Given that the states have in fact shown a certain 
robustness in the face of this judicial fear, even in periods when the Supreme 
Court has failed to exercise review,143 one must consider the possibility that by 
"constitutional" limits, the court really means not "constitutional" limits but 
"judicial" limits - limits that courts (as opposed to a different institutional 
entity) may enforce. Opponents of the categorical view have often asserted that 
questions of federalism are best left to the political process. The idea, 
associated first with Herbert Wechsler, is that Congress and the President 
reflect the interests of the states, including state sovereignty. This view suffers 
from a variety of defects but it does hint at the possibility that there is 
something more involved here than the definition of what is truly "local" or 
"national." It hints at the idea we have been considering - the consequences to 
the people of shifting a decision from state to nation, or nation to state. 
A. Lopez: Risfa to Majorities 
Federalism implicates two different relations between constituents and 
141. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 135, at 634-38; id. at 634 ("In Morrison's wake, the 
category of 'the economic' has taken on a vitality that opens up challenges to many federal 
statutes . . . ."). 
142. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77 (1936) (predicting that if the 
Court were to accept New Deal arguments in favor of the Agricultural Adjustment Act that 
"the independence of the individual states [would be] obliterated, and the United States 
converted into a central government exercising uncontrolled police power in every state of 
the Union, superseding all local control or regulation of the affairs or concerns of the 
states.") (emphasis added). Presumably, if members of Congress really did not care about 
state populations, then we would have seen greater challenges from the legislative 
department before the second century of our government's history. 
143. See, e.g., Bednar et al., supra note 40, at 255 ("But it seems to us that Amencan 
federal practices have been enormously robust in the face of massive changes in the nature 
of the society and the economy. The states and localities are still vibrant sources of policy 
determination. . ."). 
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their government. We are citizens of both state and nation. Although today we 
take this dual set of relations for granted, in 1787, the application of the federal 
government to individuals was considered one of the principal innovations of 
the Constitutional Convention. The "great vice" of the confederation was its 
operation on the states in their "corporate or collective" capacities.144 The great 
remedy was to "extend the authority of the union to the persons of the 
citizens, - the only proper objects of government."145 Then, a rather simple 
assumption was made about this dual relation: that the people would have a 
closer relationship to their state governments than to the federal. This was 
considered, by the Federalists at least, a simple matter of geography and 
acquaintance. Repeatedly, proponents of the Constitution insisted on the 
closeness of the people to their state governments relative to the federal: 
Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his 
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people 
of each State would be apt to feel a stronger byass [sic] towards their local 
governments than towards the government of the Union.146 
Today, of course, we are tempted to complete this passage and conclude 
that the loyalties that lie with a state may easily stray when the nation does a 
better job of governing. We recognize, at one level at least, that national power 
has grown with crisis, war, and recovery. We know, as well, that technological 
revolutions in communications and transportation have made us a different, and 
closer, nation. And, yet, there is a kernel of truth that remains to the proposition 
that the state governments are, at least relatively, closer to the people than is the 
federal government. Just ask yourself whether you would want your child's 
school assignment or your own parking permit issued from Washington and 
you will see that localism still lives and matters in people's lives (and this 
despite, and perhaps even because of, the communications revolution). My 
point is not that geography matters so much as that geography is often a crude 
surrogate for a sense of control and agency in citizenship. 
Localism matters because of the simple pressure that numbers seem to pose 
for our relationship to our government: With fewer numbers, we have a greater 
sense of control over our local government.147 This sense is mirrored in what 
we know about numbers and the transaction costs of governing. As a general 
rule, it is easier for a majority to be constructed in a town than a city, a state 
than in a nation (even if there may be exceptions to that rule). Notice that this 
result does not arise from the essence or presumed "nature" or "value" of 
locality or even from strong notions of either sovereignty or geography. 
Instead, it arises from the effect of numbers on the transaction costs of 
144. The Federalist No. 15, at 93 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961). 
145. Id. at 95. 
146. The Federalist No. 17, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961). 
147. There are other reasons, of course, including a political culture that has always 
prized decentralization. 
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governing, an effect that in turn finds itself expressed as the common sense 
"closeness" of individuals to smaller rather than larger governments. 
From this rather simple starting point of size, we may reconceive the 
question in modern federalism cases not as a question of descriptive categories 
but, rather, as a question about the shift from the citizen's relation to their 
federal government to their state government. When we transfer the power to 
decide - about guns or schools or violence - from the state (with its smaller 
constituencies) to the nation (with its larger constituencies), political incentives 
shift. A decisionmaker representing more people is less likely, relative to one 
who represents fewer people, to be sensitive to citizen preference. Indeed, as a 
variety of modern scholarship in political science and economics has shown, a 
disaggregated system is far more sensitive to citizen preference than a 
completely unified, national system.148 Of course, this sensitivity to majorities 
is presumptive; it may not hold in any individual case. Most importantly, it is a 
relative risk. Both state and nation may betray the people's wishes in any 
particular case (the so-called "agency" risks always persist). But if we are 
worried about predicting structural risk, then it seems uncontroversial to begin, 
at least, with a presumption that a relatively more disaggregated set of citizens 
is more likely, on average, to reflect more sensitive accounts of majoritarian 
preference.149 Indeed, it seems to me that this addresses in a straightforward 
manner some of the "anxieties" of federalism that are rather poorly and cheaply 
dressed as geography.150 
148. See Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 Pub. Choice 19, 21 (1969) 
("[T]he smaller the governmental unit the more influence any one of its citizens may expect 
to exert, consequently, the smaller the unit, the closer it will come to fitting the preference 
patterns of its citizens."); see also, e.g., Eskridge, Bednar & Ferejohn, supra note 40, at 226- 
29 (marshalling normative and positive arguments for the proposition that "[a] decentralized 
polity will usually end up with fewer dissatisfied citizens"); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size, 75 J. Pol. ECON. 123, 123-38 (1967) (arguing 
that there are diminishing returns to scale in almost all organizations; the larger the 
organization, the greater the loss of control over subordinates, which increases the cost of 
organization). 
149. One might well argue at this point that there are conflicting "majoritarian" claims 
here - the federal majority that created the statute and the majority of a state or collective of 
states that may disagree. That is true. It still remains the case, however, in deciding what 
power Congress has vis-a-vis the states, that the states are closer to the people than is the 
national government. This closer connection is, of course, relative and presumptive; the 
states may, in fact, be acting quite unlike a majority and rather like a "minority." That the 
analysis may well be, in reality, quite complex, does not however undermine the general 
notions outlined here as presumptions. 
150. Judith Resnik has argued quite persuasively in her Categorical Federalism piece 
that geography has been placed in the service of the gender status quo. Resnik, supra note 
135, at 630-34, 643-54. I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Resnik that geography may 
mask normative claims. The difference between my argument and Professor Resnik' s is that 
I focus on a story about the people's relation to their government. There is a persistence to 
the federalism anxiety and that persistence, I believe, suggests a concern about the people's 
connection/relation/control over a growing federal (and indeed global) government. The fear 
is, at least in part, that all connection to government will be lost in the "indifference" of a 
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Localism may provide benefits, but it also creates obvious costs and a 
simple comparison makes this quite clear. If it is true that smaller 
constituencies are likely to be more sensitive to majoritarian preferences, it is 
also true that they are more likely to be oppressive.151 If it is easier to gather a 
majority in a town hall than in a nation, it is also easier to gather a lynch mob in 
a town than in a nation. For every benefit obtained by a more local decision, 
there is a corresponding increase in risk - to minorities. If this is true, and we 
will see it as true in the next case, we cannot confidently end the analysis in 
praise of localism. We must worry, as Madison once did, about risks both to 
majorities and minorities.152 This is where dynamism enters the picture; this is 
where a dualist theory of political risk is revealed as embedded in federalism's 
idea of function, just as we saw it embedded in the separation of powers' idea 
of function. But let us return to the initial position, and see how it works itself 
out in real cases.153 
Applying this framework to Lopez yields some interesting results, 
suggesting that Lopez was a rather easy (if perhaps trivial) case. This is not 
because such a law would violate a "categorical" rule about crime, nor even 
because it would mean an "end of the states," or even because it might coerce 
the large states for the benefit of the small.154 It is because one should worry 
about federalism if one cares about majoritarianism. But the worry must be 
articulated correctly - it is not to a set of values or traditions or descriptions, to 
accountability155 or even state sovereignty - and it is not unalloyed.156 It is a 
distant bureaucracy. Put another way, I believe that these anxieties are ones we might call 
anxieties of voice, that is, fear that, in all this globalizing and nationalizing, the people will 
have lost a place where their voice counts. It is this that prompts me to embrace the notion of 
federalism as a question of majoritarian will. 
151. Komesar, supra note 81, at 81-82 (discussing the costs of majoritarian biases and 
their ability to generate "atrocities" against minorities, and their more pervasive character in 
local decisionmaking, such as local decisions about land use). 
1 52. The Federalist No. 1 0 (James Madison). 
153. I am not urging, nor do I believe, that every congressional decision affecting the 
states raises a risk to majorities. Moreover, as I try to articulate later, this is only the first 
level of analysis - in some cases, we must ask whether the states' claim to majoritarianism is 
really an attempt to thwart citizens' relation to their national government. 
154. On the persistence of the importance of state government, see Bednar, Eskridge, 
& Ferejohn, supra note 40, at 225, 255. 
155. On the differences between questions of accountability and representation, see 
Jane S. Schacter, Accounting for Accountability in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and 
Beyond, in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (2002), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art5 (last visited Jan. 31, 2004). 
156. The Supreme Court has increasingly relied upon the notion of "accountability" to 
resist or modify congressional claims. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922, 
929-30 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). Accountability is a difficult concept 
and one that differs from representation. It implies an actual effort to "call one to account" 
that resists the kind of thin, presumptive analysis I have suggested here. To eliminate, as 
much as possible, the "off-stage" moralizations equated with accountability (that someone 
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risk to popular representation, more specifically to the representational relation 
between citizens and their state government (a relation assumed and relied 
upon in the constitutive texts). 
One reason that Lopez seemed to raise little concern in many minds was 
precisely because state majorities appeared not to be substantively at risk: 
Many states had the very same no-guns-outside-schools policy, so it seemed 
that the interests of state majorities were not put at risk by a similar federal 
policy. Of course, the mere existence of state laws on the topic does not 
eliminate the possibility of a risk to state majorities. Parallelism in general 
policy does not warn us of the different ways in which states could choose to 
enforce the particular policy - whether by way of penalties or by way of actual 
application of the statute. Imagine a federal government that aimed to repeat all 
state criminal laws but with higher penalties, and one will easily see that such 
differences could have serious majoritarian effects. Thus, although it should not 
be overemphasized, even seemingly parallel policies may still raise risks to 
state majorities. 
Risks do not end the analysis, however. For, in the end, almost all 
constitutional risks may be undertaken for a decent enough reason. And, here, 
the case pretty much decides itself. However serious the risk to majorities in 
such a case (and relative to many cases, it seems it was fairly minor), Lopez 
was effectively decided by the fact that Congress had asserted absolutely no 
contemporaneous justification for running it.157 Of course, the government 
offered a plausible post hoc connection between the statute and commerce; but 
that is not the question asked by an analysis based on popular representation. 
The risk of failing the "categories" is a dictionary risk, a risk for the coherency 
of law perhaps, but not the real world. The risk I am talking about lives and 
votes; it is a risk to the people of the states that their preferences will, in a 
momentary burst of national political vanity, be disregarded. To respond to 
such a claim, one cannot simply stamp one's foot and announce "commerce." 
Lopez in this sense was a rather simple case: Because of the way that the 
statute was initially passed - as a last minute technical amendment to a large 
omnibus crime bill158 - there was no rationale offered to explain the need for 
has done something "improper" for which he or she must be called to account), I have 
preferred the terms "representation" and even better "relation," which tend to have relatively 
greater resistance to such off-stage moralizations. 
157. As the Court put it, "the Government concedes that 'neither the statute nor its 
legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon 
interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone.'" Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (quoting 
Brief of the United States at 5-6). Similarly, the Court rejected the post hoc attempt of 
Congress to add findings in a later Congress on the question of interstate commerce. See id. 
at 563 n.4. 
158. In the Senate, the Gun-Free School Zones Act was passed as a last minute set of 
amendments that were added en masse to a major crime bill. See Omnibus Crime Bill, S. 
1970, 101st Cong. § 39 (1990); see also Biden/Managers Amend. No. 2104, of which the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act is a part, and which begins with a variety of amendments 
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federal, as opposed to state, intervention.159 This in turn reflected the Court's 
fears that the statute was simply a way to gain political favor in an election year 
without any consideration of the constitutional questions at issue. There was 
nothing in the record of Congress' nondeliberation160 to suggest 
deemed "technical" and "conforming." S. 1970, 101st Cong. § 39 (1990). Like many other 
amendments in that package, it was an "easy" political call in the Senate: Since many states 
had the same legislation, it was likely Senators would not consider the proposal 
controversial. When I have asserted this in public, some scholars have expressed concern 
that federalism surely must have been a concern for some Senators because the 1000 feet 
mark might have made densely populated areas, like New York City, into one continuous 
"gun- free" zone. However true that interpretation may be as a post hoc lawyer's reading of 
the statute, the argument misunderstands the Senate's political dynamics and incentives. The 
Senate's political structure strongly favors rural areas, rendering this argument largely 
irrelevant to those who are the ultimate decisionmakers. Moreover, even the Senator from a 
state that includes a large city, like New York, not only has a large urban area to represent, 
but a rural area as well. In the rural area, this kind of policy might sell very well outweighing 
whatever concerns there were about the city or, as in real life, it may simply mirror the 
wishes of many city-dwellers for more, rather than less, gun control. Having been on the 
floor of the Senate at the time, as counsel to the manager of the bill, I can say that there was 
no concern expressed to me by any Senator or staff member, Republican or Democrat, about 
federalism issues related to the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Overbreadth, in crime politics, 
is hardly ever regarded as a political sin and is rarely the basis of political objection. See 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505 
(2001). 
159. One cannot generalize, as a matter of fact, that Congress always or never 
considers the interests of the states or the people of the states. Sometimes, as in Lopez, time 
and political pressure align in ways that make it very unlikely that the impact of federal 
legislation on the states or state majorities will be considered. On legislative pressures that 
lead to ambiguity or lack of attention, see Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The 
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (2002). 
In other cases, however, federalism concerns may be openly debated. During roughly the 
same time period that the Congress considered the Gun-Free School Zones Act, it also 
considered a proposal to "federalize" almost all gun crimes, known then as the "D'Amato 
amendment." See Amendment No. 387 to S. 1241, the Violence Crime Control Act, 137 
Cong. Rec. S8846 (1991). The proposal initially passed the Senate handily, despite 
opposition on federalism grounds. See 137 Cong. Rec. S8848 (1991) (statement of Sen. 
Bingaman) ("I think this is the greatest example of preemption of state law that I have 
encountered since I have been in the Senate."). That proposal ultimately died but was raised 
again in 1993 and was opposed, again, on federalism grounds. See 139 Cong. Rec. SI 5384 
(1993) (statement of Sen. Biden) (stating that the "premise of federalism [is] that where the 
States can do something on their own as well as the Federal Government can do it, you 
should let the States do it."). 
160. There were hearings in the House but, as others have noted, although the 
constitutional issues were raised briefly, these were not the focus of the hearings. See Vicki 
Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 1 1 1 Harv. L. 
Rev. 2180, 2239 n.255 (1998) (stating that "[o]nly one set of hearings was held on the 
legislation, and it focused on guns and education" and citing the few instances where the 
federalism issue was raised); Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260) (stating that "although the hearings extensively addressed the 
impact of increasing firearms violence upon the educational system, the witnesses did not 
specifically discuss the effect upon interstate commerce of firearms possession on or near 
school property"). 
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counterbalancing factors - there was no debate of the issue or public 
investigation of the need for national as opposed to state action. In such 
circumstances, one can easily see why Lopez was chosen as the first of a set of 
federalism targets; it was an easy case. One can also see, however, why it is a 
trivial case in terms of its actual limits on Congress' actions. Lopez, in this 
view, amounts to the announcement of a clear statement rule161 - which 
Congress may, through a variety of means, satisfy. This, of course, does not 
answer the question of what might have happened had Congress attempted to 
provide a better rationale for its actions; I leave that harder question for the 
moment so that we may see how this analysis works itself out in the more 
recent case of United States v. Morrison. 
B. Morrison: Where Inequality Meets Commerce 
Many doubted the lasting power of Lopez, suggesting that it would have 
little resonance in future federalism decisions.162 Anyone following Congress' 
efforts during this period could not have mistaken the possibility that there 
were other statutes in the wings awaiting their federalism turn. Indeed, there 
were strong indications that Lopez was simply the warm-up act for a major 
confrontation between the courts and Congress that had been brewing over the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). There was little surprise, for example, 
among its advocates, when the court agreed to decide United States v. 
Morrison, a case challenging the constitutionality of the VAWA's civil rights 
remedy.163 The federal judiciary had lobbied against the bill for some time, and 
the Judicial Conference had targeted it as an improper exercise of 
"federalization" by Congress.164 Once the statute reached the Court, the 
Justices stood by Lopez's categorical approach. The Supreme Court held that 
Congress had no power to create VAWA's private civil rights remedy.165 The 
statute was about crime, said the Court and thus not of the "economic" sort 
sanctioned by Lopez.166 According to the Court, Congress had relied on an 
161. See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, Symposium: Reflections on United States v. 
Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 533, 552-53 (1995) (noting how easy it is to add an interstate nexus 
requirement as a constitutional "bumper-guard," avoiding the question of economic impact). 
162. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, What's A Constitution for Anyway? Of History and 
Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 885, 885 (1996) ("[A] 
growing number of experts have concluded that sweeping judicial revolution [after Lopez] is 
unlikely."); Pollak, supra note 161, at 553 (noting that "there is less in Lopez than meets the 
eye"). 
163. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
164. See Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging and 
Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 269, 271 (2000). 
165. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602. 
166. Id. at 613 ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the 
phrase, economic activity."); see also id. at 618 ("The regulation and punishment of 
intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in 
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improper aggregative rationale that would justify any federal criminal remedy. 
That, the Court said almost apocalyptically, would destroy the line between the 
"truly local" and the "truly national."167 
In easy cases, it might be sufficient for the Court to rely on definitional 
boundaries - such as the commercial "function" - to draw a firm line between 
local and national sovereignties. If Congress sought to use the Commerce 
Clause to wage war, there would be an easy answer. But, Morrison was not an 
easy case in this sense. Congress had worked on the Act for four years and had 
articulated, albeit under the pre-Lopez cases then applicable, a rational basis for 
connecting gender-based violence to commerce.168 The argument was one that 
had been made before in the context of the 1964 civil rights remedies - that 
national commerce was "tainted" by discrimination. In a series of reports, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee explained that the fear and incidence of violence 
disadvantaged women as participants in a national economy (a disadvantage 
manifested educationally, in employment, and otherwise economically).169 The 
Supreme Court, however, found this rationale insufficient; it saw Morrison and 
Lopez as parallel cases because both involved functions the Supreme Court 
associated with the states ("police power" and "crime").170 
There is no question that the Supreme Court was right to consider the risks 
to state majorities in Morrison. As we have seen above, parallel state and 
federal criminal remedies do raise federalism issues.171 But there are good 
interstate commerce has always been the province of the States . . . ."). 
167. We . . . reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal 
conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The 
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. . . . 
Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied 
the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and 
vindication of its victims. 
Id. at 617-18 (internal citations omitted). 
168. As Justice Souter wrote in his dissent, one obvious difference from Lopez was the 
"mountain of data assembled by Congress, here showing the effects of violence against 
women on interstate commerce. Passage of the Act in 1994 was preceded by four years of 
hearings . . . ." Id. at 628-29 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); id. at 635 
("Indeed, the legislative record here is far more voluminous than the record compiled by 
Congress and found sufficient in two prior cases upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 against Commerce Clause challenges."); see, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385 
(1994) ("[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on 
interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging 
in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places 
involved, in interstate commerce ... , by diminishing national productivity, increasing 
medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate 
products . . . ."). 
169. And, indeed, the petitioner, Christy Brzonkala, had "dropped out" of college, 
citing emotional disturbances because of a rape. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602-03. 
170. "Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the 
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of 
violent crime and vindication of its victims." Id. at 618. 
171. I suspect that what motivated the Court was the suspicion, voiced in the press and 
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reasons to doubt whether this was the same problem in Morrison as it was in 
Lopez. VAWA's civil rights remedy created no parallel criminal penalties; it 
created no cherry-picking license for federal prosecutors - it was a private civil 
remedy. Perhaps more importantly, this was why state officials (presumably 
representing the affected "federalism parties") supported the remedy both in 
Congress and in the Supreme Court: because it was not a parallel federal 
criminal law.172 The remedy was a supplementary civil rights action initiated 
by private parties. In much the same way that Title VII' s sexual harassment 
remedies supplement rather than supplant state tort remedies, so too would 
VAWA's civil damage remedies have supplemented state civil and criminal 
laws. Although evidence of state support is - and cannot be - constitutionally 
determinative, any realistic assessment of the risk to state majorities presented 
by the Morrison statute should take into account the states' own asserted 
position.173 
There is, however, a far more glaring omission in the Morrison opinion. 
The states may be relatively more sensitive to majoritarian preferences, but 
privately, that VAWA was not a truly majoritarian remedy. There was the fear that the 
federal government, although shrouding itself in the mantle of majoritarianism, was in fact 
acting on behalf of a few feminists who had bamboozled the Senate into passing the statute. 
See Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act, New Republic, July 12, 1993, at 12 (reporting that 
feminist activists were promoting the VAWA but that at least some feminists thought the 
Senate had no idea what it was passing). Knowing a bit about the remedy, myself, I know 
that this story is wrong. But, even if I had not worked for the Senate at the time, I would 
doubt it in large part because it is so incredibly difficult to pass any piece of legislation. In 
the end, however, if this were the basis for the judicial opposition either in Congress or on 
the Supreme Court, it should have been addressed as such, allowing there to be a fair 
response. 
172. Amici curiae representing 36 states filed briefs arguing that the civil rights remedy 
in the Violence Against Women Act did not impinge on states' rights. See Brief of the States 
of Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, and the Commonwealths of Massachusestts and 
Puerto Rico, as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, Nos. 99-5, 99- 
29, 1999 U.S. Briefs 5, *2 (Nov. 12, 1999) ("Section 13981 does not undermine federalism 
. . 
."); id. at *15-16 ("The remedy that Congress chose is a necessary complement to the 
States' continuing efforts to redress gender-motivated violence, and also comports with the 
federal government's recognized role in protecting civil rights .... The States' own 
assessments of their legal responses to violence against women demonstrate that state 
protections remain inadequate . . . ."); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Cool to Law Protecting 
Women, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2000, at A18 (noting that an additional state, Alabama, had 
filed a brief on the other side). 
173. Some Justices have insisted that the states and the federal government cannot, by 
their agreement, render a law constitutional. At the same time, it is also true that the states, 
and their real assertions of interest, should not be ignored by a court aiming to protect 
federalism interests. To believe otherwise is to run the risk of enforcing federalism "against" 
the states. On this and the state support in the Supreme Court, see Nourse, Vertical 
Separation, supra note 37, at 780 & n.122. 
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they are relatively less sensitive to minorities. The federalism analysis cannot 
stop at countermajoritarian effect; it has to consider, as well, whether there is 
a risk to state minorities. In Morrison, the Court completely ignored the risk 
that states were particularly poorly situated to address the matters Congress 
sought to remedy - discrimination embedded in the states' own justice systems. 
If there was anything quite clear about the record that Congress compiled in 
Morrison, it was that gender discrimination was pervasive and deeply rooted in 
state systems (and thus likely to resist direct challenge as "intentional" 
discrimination by particular actors under either state or federal anti- 
discrimination law).174 Moreover, Congress could rationally have concluded 
that this kind of discrimination was best uprooted and illuminated by the 
federal, unelected judiciary, rather than elected state judges who would have a 
relatively greater incentive to lean toward majority preference at the expense of 
minority protection. If this analysis of the federalism risks in Morrison is right, 
the decision was far from governed by Lopez; indeed, it presented precisely the 
opposite issue: Whether the federal government's relative advantage in 
enforcing the demands of equality provides a rational basis on which the 
federal government may intrude upon state majorities. 
If this is right, this analysis should (in a perfect world) help - rather than 
hinder - the effort to respond to post-Morrison concerns about the continued 
constitutional status of the 1964 Civil Rights Act remedies. Although the Court 
has shown no interest in overturning Katzenbach v. McClung115 and Heart of 
Atlanta Motel}16 there are Lopez-based arguments that would seem to put them 
in jeopardy, at least to the extent the cases' overt rationales are grounded in the 
Commerce Clause. A vertical analysis of Morrison may point the way toward a 
more effective reconciliation of the cases and a firmer basis on which to rest 
future arguments in favor of the civil rights cases. 
There is no question that protecting commerce from inequalities may 
intrude on localities, just as protecting commerce from unfair labor practices 
does. Darby's lumber yard and Ollie's barbecue are unmistakably "local" 
enterprises. A vertical analysis, however, cannot end with a risk to local 
majorities. It must also include the rival effect that a shift to localities increases 
the risk of individual or minority oppression. The answer to the civil rights 
cases is not to pit equality against commerce but to recognize that these 
rationales should reinforce the exercise of national power. Where commerce 
and inequality converge, Congress 'power in these cases should be greater, not 
lesser. If the national government is to guarantee the equality of all citizens - as 
national citizens - it must be able to act even in the face of the opposition of 
state majorities. 
174. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 629-30 (listing findings of state gender bias task 
forces). 
175. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
176. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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The Separation of Powers and Its "Implied" Federalism 
The skeptic will respond that, so far, a vertical incentive-based analysis has 
not resolved the "harder" federalism case; the critic will posit a statute 
regulating education or environment for which Congress has given a plausible 
rationale for the exertion of national power and suggested "effects" on 
commerce. If Congress, unlike in Lopez,111 asserts a substantial reason for its 
innovation and there is no argument, as in Morrison, that the states are 
relatively poor decisionmakers because of state bias, we appear to have a 
harder case. Indeed, we must confront the "truth" of federalism that the Court 
so assiduously ignores. Just as with the separation of powers, where we know 
that the administrative state tends to resist neat functional divisions, we also 
know that, in a national, indeed globalized, economy, there is little (including 
family law and divorce) that does not have a "connection" to our commercial 
life. When the categories run out, we must look to constitutional structure, 
where that structure is understood not as a set of categorical labels but, instead, 
as a set of relationships to the people. Enter the separation of powers and its 
"implied federalism" dimension. 
Let us assume that, in Lopez, Congress had set forth a plausible rationale 
for asserting the commerce power. Let us imagine, for example, that Congress 
put together a record showing increasing national gang activity - that the Crips 
and the Bloods had fanned out across the nation, posing a threat to school 
children and that one way in which these gangs obtained members was by 
enlisting them in a culture that proved one was "macho" by carrying a gun in 
school. Let us also posit that state authorities, and various state organizations, 
had testified in Congress that they needed federal help to stop the flow of guns 
to the Crips and the Bloods. Such a case is clearly harder than Lopez or 
Morrison. We cannot simply say that Congress has failed (as in Lopez) or that 
there is an obvious federal interest that the states cannot fulfill because of bias 
(as I have argued about Morrison). 
In the more difficult case, our federalism question comes down to a 
question of the separation of powers. Presumably, if one cares about 
federalism, one should want doubts resolved by the national institution most 
likely to reflect the interests of the states (albeit at the federal level). And here, 
the answer seems straightforward. As a relative matter, and at the federal level, 
it is more likely that Congress (versus the Supreme Court) will be able to 
reflect, and thus protect, the majoritarian preferences of the people in the states 
177. It is one thing to decide, as in Lopez, that a Congress that fails to provide a 
constitutive claim for national authority must do better. In such a case, it seems to me 
perfectly appropriate for a court to identify the risk and demand that Congress provide some 
justification; at the very least, such a "clear statement" rule increases the political saliency of 
the issue and thus provides the opportunity for dissenters to vocalize their opposition. 
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and localities. And this is true, or at least relatively true, whether or not one 
believes that the national government adequately represents the states or their 
sovereignty in some absolute sense. There may be no perfect fit, but wise 
structural presumptions do not, by definition, always fit perfectly. It may be 
that, in any individual case, the Supreme Court will do a better job than 
Congress of reflecting the will of the states' citizenry. But as a prediction based 
on structural incentive, it seems fair to say that the least representative 
department - the judiciary - is least favorably positioned to reflect the 
majoritarian (or for that matter minoritarian) preferences of states and 
localities. 
All of this suggests the propriety (at least in doubtful cases) of a strong rule 
of judicial deference to Congress' judgments about risks to state majorities. 
Such a rule, of course, has been the law for some time - or at least was the law 
until Lopez. Vertical analysis, however, offers a sounder reason for that rule of 
deference than arguments about whether there really "are" effects on commerce 
or whether these effects are "substantial" enough to satisfy the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, the reason for deference offered by vertical analysis comes from 
federalism itself- the implied federalism that, in part, generates the national 
government in three separate departments. Note that this is not the Wechslerian 
claim that the federal government protects state sovereignty. Instead, it is a 
claim based on the fact that the people's relation to their federal government is 
mediated by the people's relation to the states; it is in states, not in the nation, 
that the people vote for members of Congress and vote for a President and, 
through these, appoint Supreme Court Justices. One need not believe, as an 
empirical or legislative matter, that Congress or the President always protects 
the states or state sovereignty, in fact or in theory, to recognize that, as a matter 
of relative relation (with emphasis on the relative), the courts are less well 
situated than Congress or the President to assess the needs of the citizenry of 
states and localities.178 And, as a result, the answer in our more complex case 
should turn on deference by the Supreme Court to the political departments. 
One might argue that this move to the separation of powers is too quick 
because, if this is true, then all questions of judicial review are questions raising 
separation of powers issues. I recognize that many think that the separation of 
powers cases constitute a set of discrete, eccentric cases about structural 
innovation (in other words, about independent counsels and sentencing 
commissions and legislative vetoes), but I do not believe that this fits with the 
original understanding of our Constitution's structure or the doctrine of 
separated powers. Nor do I believe that the implications of a more generalized 
178. To some extent, this analysis explains the paradoxical position of Lopez. As the 
subject of scholarly discussion, Lopez has been written about extensively and many have 
found that it represents a significant statement of principle. But as a fact of real life, Lopez 
represents very little change in the standard operating procedures of federalism. See Pollak, 
supra note 161 (noting how easy it is for Congress to avoid Lopez by adding an interstate 
travel requirement in its criminal statutes). 
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view - that exercise of judicial power to overrule a federal statute raises 
separation of powers issues - is particularly controversial. Modern scholars 
have readily considered judicial review as a matter of the relation of judicial to 
legislative power.179 If the countermajoritarian difficulty, and our obsession 
with it, means anything, it means that judicial review has been considered 
(albeit inadequately) as a reflection of structural concerns for some time 
now.180 
But there is an important qualification to this point. There is a difference, 
and it was considered an important difference at the founding of the nation, 
between the Supreme Court overruling a federal statute and the Supreme Court 
overruling a state statute. In cases considered today as ones of federalism (for 
example, cases of congressional power under the Commerce Clause), it is often 
assumed that the principal structural issue is vertical (involving the federal 
government versus the states), and this is contrasted with the review of federal 
statutes (which is considered primarily a matter of horizontal relation, between 
the courts and Congress). I am arguing here, contrary to this convention, that 
review of state statutes also has important horizontal (separation of powers) 
implications. 
A Supreme Court that routinely strikes down state laws (whether under the 
First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendment) asserts its power not only vis-a-vis the 
states but also vis-a-vis the other national departments as potential 
decisionmakers. By asserting that the courts' constitutive relations, their 
relations to the people (relatively distant ones), should govern federalism 
issues, the Court asserts its decisionmaking authority and its removal from the 
people as appropriate relative to that of Congress and the President. Whether 
this arises because the issue is dubbed one of Section Five power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment or because it is dubbed one of the "commerce power" 
is irrelevant o this assessment; both raise important questions about horizontal 
constitutional structure, or separation of powers.181 
If this is right, then every time that the Court decides a federalism case it 
finds itself in a rather paradoxical position - it asserts the power of the national 
department least likely to reflect the wishes of state citizens in the name of 
states.182 From this institutional difference, some have asserted absolutist 
179. See generally BlCKEL, supra note 3, at 16 (describing the "root difficulty" of 
judicial review in institutional terms as a "counter-majoritarian force" in our system). 
180. On the academic obsession with this issue, see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an 
Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 
Yale. L.J. 153(2002). 
181. Post & Siegel, supra note 7, at 1945-50 (considering the separation of powers 
implications of the Section 5 power). 
182. Lest this seem like an academic paradox, one need only refer to the actual 
litigation in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), in which state attorney generals 
argued, in the Supreme Court, that the remedy struck down by the Supreme Court on 
federalism grounds was not in fact inconsistent with states' rights. For relevant background 
materials, see supra note 172. 
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rules - that the Supreme Court should never or should always decide federalism 
questions. But absolutism of this sort bears its own risks: Under the "no 
review" scenario, Congress is encouraged to believe that it can ignore the 
states; under the "review always" scenario, the Supreme Court is encouraged to 
believe that there are no limits to its power to assess the will of majorities. Both 
institutions may be wrong, and thus both must be encouraged to practice 
institutional humility, to recognize the limits of their own constitutive structure. 
Congress must understand that, in some cases, its need for action and results 
(the "constitutive virtues")183 may work to silence the claims of state citizens; 
the Court must understand that its lack of connection to the people will mean 
that it may actually harm state and national citizens in the name of an imagined 
legal geography.184 
IV. Implications of Verticality 
It is time, now, to situate this approach in a larger theoretical frame.. If a 
constitution is more than something for courts to interpret, as the popular 
constitutionalism literature suggests, then we must reconsider the 
judiciocentrism of conventional theories of constitutional structure. The 
theories of Ely, Bickel, and Choper185 are no longer enough because the focus 
of the telescope has widened from a theory of judicial review to a theory of the 
whole Constitution and its application to all of the departments. Put in other 
words, we must consider the possibility that no theory of judicial review will 
suffice unless it begins with a theory of constitutional structure. 
A. The Question of Constitutional Ontology 
No one who looks candidly at the administrative state can say that our 
Constitution divides our government by function. We may still cling to this 
legal process ideal, but by now it is well-known that each of the departments 
performs each of the functions (executive, legislative, and judicial).186 In such 
183. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 159, at 615-16 (discussing these constitutive 
virtues). 
184. See, e.g., Nourse, Vertical Separation, supra note 37, at 801-02. 
185. See Bickel, supra note 3, at chs. 1 & 4 (arguing that the "root difficulty for 
constitutional law was that "judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force," and arguing for 
the passive virtues as an important response to the potential "deviance" and "activism" of the 
courts in constitutional controversies, id. at 128, of the court); Choper, supra note 3, at chs. 
2-5 (arguing that the power of judicial review should extend only to the protection of 
individual rights rather than structural matters, such as federalism and separation of powers 
cases); Ely, supra note 3 (offering a representation-reinforcement theory as a means of 
legitimating judicial review). 
186. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers 
Questions- A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL . Rev. 488, 492 (1987) ("Virtually 
every part of the government Congress has created - the Department of Agriculture as well 
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a world, to assert a function-based view is simply wishful thinking and even a 
misreading of the text itself (which jumbles functional descriptions).187 And, 
yet, the functional ideal remains pervasive. Virtually all the principal 
constitutional methodologies - from textualism to originalism to pragmatism - 
proceed upon this basis when trying to resolve structural problems. We have 
textualist theories of structure that depend upon function188 and originalist 
theories of structure that depend upon function;189 we have individual rights 
theories190 and formalist theories,191 and even game theories,192 of structure 
that rely upon function. It is precisely because these methodologies rely upon 
this idea (that government amounts to a description of separate and discrete 
activities) that they have failed over and over again to illuminate how the 
Constitution actually governs. 
So far, I have tried to show that it is possible and even attractive to 
construct a constitutional anatomy grounded in governing relations rather than 
in functional descriptions. I have also tried to show that, once function is 
understood as a proxy for risks to constituency, this helps moderate the 
apparent contradictions of a variety of categorical judgments and illuminates 
what was known at the founding of the nation: that federalism and the 
as the Securities and Exchange Commission - exercises all three of the governmental 
functions the Constitution so carefully allocates among Congress, President, and Court."). 
187. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (arguing that the text may be read 
to give "executive" and "judicial" power to the Senate and "legislative" power to the 
President). This was, of course, a complaint of the Antifederalists and, as such, was well 
known to James Madison and others. See supra note 95. 
188. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 26, at 1175-76 (assuming that the vesting 
clauses of Articles II and III strongly support a functional division of powers that grants the 
executive all executive power); Redish & Cisar, supra note 16, at 455 (arguing for a 
traditional allocation of authority that depends upon the notion that "the exercise of each 
branch's power is to be limited to the functions definitionally brought within those 
concepts"). 
189. See Carter, supra note 24, at 765, 783 (arguing for an approach based on relatively 
determinate meanings of the "text and its historical background," that, when applied, relies 
on the idea of function). Even those who are not originalists, but who take a historical 
approach, have tended to embrace the idea of function uncritically, despite good evidence of 
the difficulty of the very idea of governmental function in the founding period. See Gerhard 
Casper, Separating Power: Essays on the Founding Period 1 (1997) (attributing a 
"functional" separation of powers to the founding); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous 
Branch, 105 Yale. L.J. 1725, 1732 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of a historical 
approach that assumes a functional ideal). But see Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional 
Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 1 1 1 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1381, 1385 (1998) (questioning the projection of modern concepts of judicial function 
onto early American practice). 
190. See Brown, supra note 27, at 1513-14 (urging that the separation of powers serves 
to protect individual rights and relying upon an assumption about functional division). 
191. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 16, at 455 (assuming a functional division of 
powers in offering a pragmatic formalist approach). 
192. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 92 (assuming a functional ideal in applying a 
game theoretic approach). 
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separation of powers are generatively intertwined.193 There may well be 
something quite natural in the ideal of an "activities" constitution: It hails from 
the single most influential legal movement in the late twentieth century - the 
legal process movement with all its enthusiasm for institutional competences 
and purposes.194 That a functionally driven constitutional ontology should be 
natural to legal process scholars should not mean, however, that it is inevitable 
or true or even illuminating. 
The relations of governance have eluded us, at least in part, because 
constitutional scholars have, for the last generation, been obsessed with 
creating a methodology for judicial review.195 Importantly, a vertical, 
incentive-based analysis does not proceed from that assumption. I have not 
asserted a textual model for deciding structural cases (although I think my 
argument does rely upon text - the text that creates the relations between the 
people and their government). I have not claimed, for example, that my 
approach commands respect because it allows the judiciary to choose the 
"right" values in a laundry list of potential values served by the separation of 
powers or federalism.196 To be sure, I have placed the representative relation at 
the core of the analysis, but I have not, and this is very important to recognize, 
insisted that representation always succeeds or is always a positive value. 
Representation might fail entirely either in particular cases or more generally, 
and this theory might still be the best approach we can devise to understand the 
effects of innovation on constitutional structure. Similarly, I have resisted the 
notion that text or history - as methodologies associated with judicial review - 
should operate as interpretive trumps; indeed, I have rejected the classic 
textualist and originalist arguments and insisted upon the poverty of using 
vesting clause jurisprudence as a means to understand the whole Constitution. 
I have managed to avoid this search for a judicial methodology because I 
have changed the question - from how a court should "review" structural cases 
to a question that I think should have priority: what the structure of the 
Constitution is, whether it is a set of legal descriptions or something more ~ a 
set of governing relations and incentives. Much of the constitutional 
interpretation literature has tended to make an important assumption - that the 
structure of the Constitution is a set of words that describe and thus cabin the 
world of power, that constitutional structure is no different in this respect from 
the rest of the Constitution, it is simply "ordinary law." And this seems to apply 
193. See supra Part I.B; supra notes 47-48 (discussing the role of state representational 
concerns in allocating power at the national level). 
194. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 141-42 
(1994) (discussing the importance of the legal process movement). Interestingly enough, one 
of the synonyms for "function" is "purpose," an idea associated with the legal process 
school. Another meaning, however, is "gathering," as in a cocktail party as a function. 
195. See supra notes 3-4. 
196. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 73, at 432-37 (listing a variety of "values" such as 
efficiency and accountability and rule of law served by the separation of powers). 
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whether one is a textualist or a pragmatist or an originalist. There is no open 
dispute among textualists or pragmatists or even originalists about how the 
structural text is law, only questions about how courts should interpret what 
seems, indisputably, to be law. The words are thought to constrain government 
by virtue of a binding edict of legal interpretation. 
If anything I have said about structure illuminates, it does so precisely 
because I have departed from this assumption. I have tried to consider the 
whole Constitution prior to attempting to reach the question of judicial review. 
And I have treated the Constitution not only as ordinary law but as fundamental 
law, by which I mean a law that, first and foremost, creates a set of dynamic 
relations between the people and their government. It is important to remember 
that this "constitutive" understanding is as grounded in the text as is a more 
descriptive approach. I have simply focused on texts that are ignored in 
standard textualist approaches. The texts I have considered are ignored for a 
reason: They are not considered the appropriate kind of "constitutional law." 
And they are not considered the appropriate kind of "constitutional law" 
because they are not the kind of texts that courts typically cast as capable of 
interpretation as 
<l 
ordinary law. 
" 
They are not the proper kind of texts because 
they actually create the government rather than describe it. 
Why should descriptive texts take priority in standard interpretive 
methodologies? They take priority, I believe, because they are consistent with a 
vision of constitutional law that is a projection of courts' own institutional 
mission. Courts proceed upon the theory that the Constitution constrains 
political power by judicial interpretation (for example, in defining executive or 
judicial or state power, it is thought that courts constrain political bodies). But, 
if I am right that the constitutive texts are crucial to understanding the structure 
of the Constitution, then there is more than an "ordinary law" approach to 
consider. The Constitution constrains not only by "ordinary law," but also by a 
fundamental, embedded law of constitutive relations to the people. Those 
relations work everyday, not simply the days on which the Supreme Court 
holds forth on federalism or the separation of powers. Indeed, if Larry Kramer 
is right, constitutionalists have failed to appreciate the ancient distinction 
between the constitution as "fundamental law" which governs political 
structure and the constitution as "ordinary law" binding in standard 
judiciocentric terms.197 
197. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 34 ("Constitutional or 
fundamental law subsisted as an independent modality, distinct from both politics and from 
the ordinary law interpreted and enforced by courts. It was a special category of law. It 
possessed critical attributes of ordinary law: Its obligations were meant to be binding, for 
example, and its content was not a matter of mere will or policy but reflected rules whose 
meaning was determined by argument based on precedent, analogy, and principle. Yet 
constitutional law also purported to govern the sovereign itself, thus generating controversies 
that were inherently matters for resolution in a political domain.") (citation to draft 
manuscript on file with author). 
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To be sure, this view of fundamental, performed law, of incentive and 
relation, is not complete; it does nothing to supplant the court's interpretive role 
when applying ordinary law. And yet the conventional view - that the ordinary 
law model is complete - should by now be seen as false. Put simply, the 
document does not only "say" or "report" what it is doing, but it creates and 
releases the public's political energies. Constituent relations are the 
Constitution's structure, or at least they have as great a claim to structural 
consideration as do the words that describe particular powers or departments. 
To see the relevant constitutional text as limited to those terms most hospitable 
to judicial "interpretation" is, in the end, to risk seeing constitutional structure 
as a means for judicial review; it is to risk a court that looks into the 
Constitution and sees only itself. 
B. The Case of the Empty Constitution 
To understand the dangers of the judiciocentric view, let us begin with the 
most immediately compelling of constitutional methodologies, textualism 
(which for sake of clarity I will call "judicial textualism" because it takes as its 
starting point the judiciocentric position on the nature of the Constitution). 
Judicial textualism198 gives us a vision of the separation of powers heavily 
dependent upon the precise terminology of certain parts of the Constitution, and 
most particularly, the vesting clauses, down to the "hereinafters," "ands," and 
"ors."199 From the position of a judicial textualist, the argument I have offered 
here is deeply flawed because it relies upon the wrong "text" - the words 
"legislative," "executive," and "states" are the "real" text, not the constitutive 
provisions creating the bodies that govern us. 
But the judicial textualists' problem with this anatomy cannot be that the 
argument is not based on text. The constitutive texts are very important texts 
indeed. The real debate must be about something other than raw textuality. 
When we look to the constitutive texts, we do not reach for the dictionary to 
determine the "meaning" of voting or representation. We do not "translate" the 
term "representation" or search for an equivalent legal expression from the 
present or past. Instead, the meaning of these provisions resides in what they 
198. The principal feature of "judicial textualism," as I am using that term here, is that 
it focuses on the words in the vesting clauses or other clauses in the Constitution that 
describe federal and state institutions and thus appear to demand that the analysis depend 
upon the meaning of such specific terms as "commerce" or "executive" or "state." 
199. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 26, at 1175-76 (relying upon precise 
differences in the vesting clauses to make inferences about constitutional structure: "The 
most obvious difference [between the three vesting clauses] is that the Article II and III 
vesting clauses omit the qualifying language 'herein granted' found in the vesting clause of 
Article I. What significance can be attributed to this omission? To begin with, it suggests 
that the President is to have all of the executive power and the Article III judiciary is to have 
all of the judicial power.") (emphasis in original). But see U.S. Const, art. I, § 7 (granting 
the President power to veto bills, in an article devoted to "legislative powers"). 
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do, in what they create, in their performance, in their constitution, in the future. 
Article I, Section 2 provides that the "House of Representatives shall be 
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several 
States . . . ."200 Article II, as amended, provides that electors appointed by the 
states shall vote for a President and Vice-President.201 These provisions create 
relations that then constitute government by people acting upon them. Thus, the 
importance of the constitutive provisions is not their meaning to courts, but 
their meaning to the Constitution of real, political, life - to those who are 
silenced and to those whose voices are amplified, to the people constituted in 
various political constituencies. 
The real debate here, then, is not about textuality. Instead, the real debate is 
about what the text is. If one believes that constitutional structure is only about 
allocating a set of characteristic activities (or functions), then one is looking for 
the text to speak about activities (or functions).202 And if one is asking such a 
question, then the vesting clauses are the places where the relevant language 
can be found. Notice, however, how this entire train of thought perpetuates its 
assumptions, how the original ontological assumption (that one is looking for 
an "activities" text to be translated by a court) finds itself repeated in the 
ultimate conclusion. We are now in a position to see the paradoxes created by a 
"judiciocentric position" toward constitutional structure. 
Observe, first, how the textualist methodology has found the text rather 
than the text finding the methodology. Because the judicial interpreter is 
looking for a set of words that a court might apply, translate, or redefine, she 
seizes upon the vesting clauses. Once we know that there is more text to be 
considered (the constitutive provisions), this leads to the paradox that judicial 
methodology has become more important than the text - since, if one wanted to 
consider the entire text, one would have to take some account of the 
constitutive provisions. Moreover, there are significant effects to this 
privileging of textualist theory: Notice what has happened to the whole text, 
which literally has been "emptied" of governance. The vesting clauses present 
us with a mere picture of a government, a word painting that depicts organized 
"competencies" or "functions" or "purposes," but provides no actual means for 
elections or representation or voting. If the vesting clauses and associated texts 
200. U.S. Const, art. I, § 2. The full provision goes on to further specify the relation 
between individuals and the House by providing for apportionment of representatives among 
the states. 
201. U.S. Const, art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. Const, amend. XII (separating the votes 
for President and Vice-President). 
202. To ask of constitutional structure whether an innovation is within the institution's 
competence is simply to ask the "function question" - that is, to ask whether a particular 
activity belongs within a department because of the department's characteristic activities. To 
ask the "legal process question" thus already assumes that courts, agencies, and Congress are 
what they do. 
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are all there is,203 then we have quite literally elevated the needs of judicial 
review above those of governance. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, notice how judicial textualism 
appears to elevate some of the least important provisions of the Constitution to 
a place where they become the most important in structural theory.204 The 
vesting clauses can be eliminated with little effect on real governance.205 And 
yet they have been the center of attention in constitutional theory and case law. 
They are, in other words, important in a world in which the Constitution is what 
courts and lawyers do; courts look to this kind of text because this is the kind of 
text that "can" be interpreted. But, in such a world, we risk our government 
being emptied of its content - the courts confidently standing by with an 
exquisitely ordered legal universe inhabited by no one. 
Judicial textualism, as an interpretive methodology, is parasitic of the very 
idea that I am challenging - a constitutional ontology that celebrates, albeit 
without identification, the Constitution as the "sole province" of the judiciary. 
The "text" that courts see is, in this sense, a text of their own making. This self- 
referentiality, however, is not limited to textualist claims but applies to other 
constitutional methodologies as well. It is just as easy, for example, to find a 
textualist theory of the separation of powers that is built upon the search for a 
descriptive and legalistic essentialism (function as read into the text) as it is to 
find a historical theory built upon the same premise (function as read into 
history).206 Originalists (despite the risks of presentism in the functional ideal) 
have enthusiastically embraced the notion of function, looking for functions in 
203. This way of stating the argument owes much to conversations with Scott Shapiro. 
204. The costs of this erasure may be quite significant in the real world - to real 
majorities and minorities. Consider the decision in Morrison v. Olson (the independent 
counsel case), a case that today is widely considered to have been wrongly decided. 487 U.S. 
654 (1988). Standard accounts tell us that the decision was wrong because the Court's 
majority failed to apply textual analysis: All executive power did not remain in the 
executive. But this analysis, as I have argued elsewhere, emphasized the linguistic risks of a 
particular category ("executive") and ignored the real risks to the individual from Congress' 
prosecutorial actions and to majorities from the independent counsel's ties to the 
impeachment process. Nourse, Vertical Separation, supra note 37, at 768-72. 
205. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
206. See Flaherty, supra note 1 89, at 1 744 ('The other historicist school of separation 
of powers scholarship undermines the Unitarian position. Here, the argument runs that the 
Founders themselves mainly possessed a functional approach . . . ."). Professor Flaherty is 
here referring to "functionalism" as a school of thought, but it is also true that the 
"functionalists" about which he speaks, as well as his own article, relies upon the idea of 
function as uncontroversial. As Flaherty recognizes, the founders were quite confused about 
what the departments or the separation of powers would actually "do." See id. at 1776 
("American constitutionalists did not in fact advance a comprehensive conception of 
separation of powers . . . ."). In my view, as I have written elsewhere, the founders were far 
more certain about what "relations" would govern the departments (precisely because those 
relations were at the heart of the debate at the constitutional convention and were, in fact, 
enumerated in the text), than they were of more modern ideas of the "purposes" of the 
doctrine. See Nourse, Due Foundation, supra note 46, at 459-63, 493-97. 
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the ratification debates or at the Convention, in the First Congress or in 
Madison's massive correspondence.207 Each of these interpreters is looking for 
a rule for courts and finds such a rule by searching for texts that can be used by 
courts.208 
This argument, if right, has important implications for standard views of 
constitutional methodology. To the extent that theories of structure based on 
text or history or precedent all search for an ideal that privileges judicial 
review, then these theories are "picking and choosing" relevant text or 
history - picking and choosing based on which text best matches what courts 
do. The textualist picks and chooses the vesting clauses as the "right text" and 
never looks, or even considers "as text," the constitutive provisions. The 
historical view takes its cue from this same notion, looking for historical 
divisions of executive, legislative, and judicial power, or perhaps something 
more generally purposive like balance or energy, and yet ignores history 
showing the importance the Founders attached to generative relations. Finally, 
precedential views, in their development of formal and functional models, tend 
to repeat this error, taking their cue as well from the essentialist ideas of state or 
federal, executive or legislative. If this is right, by privileging a narrowly 
"descriptivist" vision of the Constitution rather than a "constitutive" and more 
popular one, the standard constitutional methodologies tend to risk judicial self- 
referentiality. If the only evidence that an investigator uses is the evidence that 
207. See Flaherty, supra note 189, at 1801 ("Final confirmation for a functional 
understanding comes from the national debate over whether to ratify the Constitution, 
arguably the most important source of all ... ."). Again, this is referring to the modern 
doctrinal position of "functionalism," as contrasted with formal lines: Flaherty's own picture 
is more complex, preferring, as historians often do, the purposes/functions of accountability 
and energy and balance to the terms executive and legislative, but these ends, however more 
elegant and historically more accurate, partake of the intellectual structure of the standard 
inquiry. See, e.g., id. at 1832. 
208. Interpretive theories based on representation do not avoid this problem. Professor 
BickeFs "passive virtues" theory, for example, is justified as a form of deference to 
legislative majorities. See Bickel, supra note 3, at ch. 4. And, yet, this view is placed in the 
service of a theory, not of the entire Constitution, but of something higher and better - 
"judicial review." Similarly, Professor Ely's work is fully consistent with the view that the 
Constitution must protect against minoritarian biases but, again, his theory, like Bickel 's, is a 
theory of "judicial review." See Ely, supra note 3, at ch. 4. Both theories privilege courts 
openly and develop a view of courts which depends on an oversimplified dichotomy 
between law and politics. Under Ely's view, one only cares about politics because of 
legislatures' failures and, under Bickel' s view, one only cares about politics because of 
courts' failures. Neither view finds any reason to distinguish between the House and the 
Senate, the President and Congress; we might as well simply have one big institution we call 
the "political" one. The claimed deference of these theories to politics is really quite the 
opposite for both theories are, as Richard Parker has put it, "disdainful" of ordinary political 
energies, energies that are at the heart of a constitutive anatomy of constitutional structure. 
See Richard D. Parker, "Here the People Rule": A Constitutional Populist 
Manifesto 67-70 (1994) (arguing that the cliche of countermajoritarianism reflects an ironic 
disdain for politics). Politics, in what I take to be the Constitution's sense of it, must be more 
robustly defined than as simply "anything other than law." 
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works for his method or perspective, then his method has become more 
important than his results. 
In the end, the Constitution's own text tells us that judicial textualism must 
be wrong as a structural theory. For if one is claiming that the argument is 
legitimate because it is textual, then one cannot be picking and choosing one's 
text. If the constitutive provisions of the Constitution count for anything - and 
they must - then judicial textualism has contradicted its own claims to 
legitimacy. 
C. Political Economy, History, and Convergence 
Finally, it is time to answer the critic who argues that I have done just what 
I have complained that others have done, that is, I have focused on alternative 
explanations for Supreme Court cases and even, impliedly, set forth a theory of 
judicial review of structural matters. Yes, I have sought to show how the 
"constitutive provisions" in the Constitution might illuminate particular legal 
issues. (My aim here, at least in part, is not only to lay out abstract theory, but 
also to show how this might actually illuminate real political controversies.) 
And I believe that courts can apply such an analysis; indeed, in the guise of the 
amorphous notion of "accountability," some Justices have already attempted to 
do just that.209 And yet I have tried, as I show below, to avoid the pitfalls of 
self-referentiality that typically accompany the "judiciocentric position." The 
text as descriptor, as constraint-by-court, should be respected and will work in 
easy cases to resolve structural controversies, but in harder cases, we must look 
deeper. The courts are, after all, charged with understanding the Constitution as 
a whole. And a "whole" understanding, in my view, must recognize that the 
Constitution constrains and regulates power not only by its words, but also by 
its very structure and relations. 
I have started with a theory that seeks to better describe the Constitution as 
a whole, with all of its provisions: those that look like they are ripe for 
interpretation and those that generate governance. Having said that, whether or 
not this particular theory proves workable, the most important point here 
reduces to a simpler question of humility. It would be wise, in my view, if 
courts were to consider themselves among equals and if they were to embrace a 
view of the whole Constitution in which all departments are enjoined and 
entitled to consider constitutional questions - not because this would always 
yield correct results, but because it would give living meaning to the generative 
provisions of the Constitution as well as to the judicial ones. It would also be 
wise if Congress and the President were to take that view. But even if one were 
not to accept these recommendations in a strong form, one could nevertheless 
accept the need for greater self-consciousness by all institutions about their 
relative role in the polity. 
209. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 710 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Perhaps this is simply wishful thinking; perhaps institutional incentives are 
so strong that a court cannot do anything but see the constitutional world in its 
own judiciocentric image.210 But there are reasons to worry about how far the 
Supreme Court has taken this view in recent years. There are real life 
consequences to structural controversies, and none of our governmental 
institutions - political or judicial - have been particularly good at predicting 
these consequences. We now know, for example, that the Supreme Court in 
Clinton v. Jones was spectacularly wrong to predict that its decision would 
have no effect on the presidency: that civil suit led to the impeachment of a 
sitting president.211 We also know that the Court's decision in Morrison v. 
Olson deeply minimized the potential harm of independent prosecutions and 
completely ignored the risks of an independent counsel's recommendations for 
impeachment.212 
This evidence suggests that there is far more at stake for the people, and for 
our government, than our present structural models predict. It also suggests 
why we have been unable to do better: because all of our attention has been 
focused in other directions, on painting an accurate linguistic portrait of power 
rather than on understanding how incentives and relations shape power. How, 
then, one might ask, are we to discover a more realistic account of structure and 
avoid the seemingly inevitable selection bias of contemporary constitutional 
methodologies? 
My best answer, one that is embedded in the account given above (and 
purposely so), is that we must look outside judicial discourse. We must borrow 
techniques and concepts from other disciplines so that we avoid "cooking up" 
another "ism," a principle or doctrine applied to decide constitutional cases that 
reflects more about courts and legal demands than those of the people.213 To 
avoid such a constitutional law, we must temper our legalistic blinders by 
testing our views against history and economics and political theory. That does 
not mean, and I emphasize this, that we must adopt a new "law and . . ." 
technique, rather than a law "in" approach.214 We should not defer wholesale to 
theories built for other purposes, whether from economics or history or politics. 
210. See DOUGLAS, supra note 19. 
211. For how judicial involvement changed the case for impeachment, see Nourse, 
Vertical Separation, supra note 37, at 770 ("It is the judicial proceeding that transforms 
public denials into claims of perjury . . .:"). 
212. Id. at 772-777. These are only the most dramatic of cases. A similar gap exists, for 
example, between the Supreme Court's rationale in Mistretta and the real life effects of the 
sentencing commission. The Commission has had an enormous impact on prosecutorial 
practices, individual rights, and judicial behavior. These are well documented phenomena. 
See, e.g., Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in 
the Federal Courts (1998). 
213. See Parker, supra note 208, at 66 (1994). 
214. The original law "and" society movement was, in fact, a law "in" society 
movement. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., In Memoriam: Willard Hurst, Master of the Legal 
Process, 1997 Wise. L. Rev 1 181, 1 183. 
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Instead, we need to seek convergence and independent confirmation. We must 
assert hypotheses based upon the whole text and its history and then test our 
theories against the findings of others.215 And, in that effort, we must import 
concepts and understandings that give us a richer and more realistic sense of 
what is at stake, in structural theory - for the people. 
The principal way in which I have tried to close this gap and, at the same 
time, control against judiciocentric bias, is to start with assumptions supported 
by a convergence of law, history, and political economy. For example, I have 
focused on the Constitution (the whole Constitution) as constructing a set of 
relations (between the people and their governors). This assumption minimizes 
the extent to which we begin from a judiciocentric position. Not only have I 
tried to avoid privileging courts, but I have also used the idea of a "relation," 
purposely trying to minimize the offstage moralizations that often come with 
more concrete descriptions such as "representation." This approach has the 
benefit of making the initial stance toward a structural question more self- 
conscious, first defining a baseline and then focusing on changes in structural 
configurations. 
This focus on relations and incentives resonates not only with history and 
text, but also with a rich literature on political economy. Indeed, one might say 
that the study of incentives sits at the core of the modern political economy 
literature.216 At the same time, this notion is not simply presentist - one can 
find it in the ratification debates and scattered throughout the constitutional 
convention. Like modern political economists, the Framers wanted to make 
predictions - even crude predictions - about what the Constitution's structure 
would accomplish.217 As both legal scholars and political scientists have noted, 
the founders' view of political relations and incentives resonates with a variety 
of work in modern political science.218 And, finally, of course, this focus on 
incentives finds a home in the text - in the generative texts that create such 
incentives, whether they be provisions about election or appointment or 
removal. 
If incentives form a key piece to this puzzle, so does a more careful focus 
215. In future work, I aim to measure this claim, about shifting incentives and 
relations, against historical accounts of actual structural conflicts. 
216. See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional change and 
Economic Performance 3 (1990) (emphasizing how all institutions "structure incentives in 
human exchange, whether political, social, or economic"); see also Arnold, supra note 68, 
at 6-8 (analyzing the ways in which electoral incentives and potential policy preferences of 
voters constrain congressional action). 
217. See, e.g., X The Documentary History of the Ratification of the 
Constitution: Ratification by the States: Virginia, supra note 45, at 1371 (statement of 
Mr. Monroe, June 18, 1788) ("The President ought to act under the strongest impulses of 
rewards and punishments, which are the strongest incentives to human actions."). 
218. See Cass R. Sunstem, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 Geo. L.J. 2267, 
2269 (1998) ("[T]he Framers wedded an understanding of likely incentive effects to the 
basic topic of institutional design . . . ."). 
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on analyzing shifting incentive structures. Lawyers consistently engage in 
labeling exercises; the meaning of words is their trade and so they tend to think 
in definitional terms. In the context of structural theory, however, this kind of 
"linguistic affinity" standard can simply perpetuate selection bias. Thus, for 
example, if one begins by asking about function, and one is looking for a term 
that "means function," then one will simply extend the judiciocentric bias to a 
new linguistic situation. One of the ways a generative anatomy aims to avoid 
the dangers of this kind of "matching game" is to make explicit the nature of 
the inquiry. One sets forth the baseline condition of the relation one assumes to 
be correct (based on an acceptance of the relations enumerated in the 
Constitution) and then asks how those relations change and what incentives the 
new relation is likely to bring to bear on the structural innovation. This helps in 
terms of candor (it is always possible that one's baseline assumptions are 
incorrect); and also helps in forcing the analysis to focus on the change in 
structure (the difference between a state of affairs with one set of incentives as 
against another). This focus on comparison, or alternatives, is again 
characteristic of work in political economy as well as debates that the founders 
themselves had about "alternative" forms of governance. A brief look, for 
example, at Madison's defense of constitutional structure in The Federalist 
makes clear that his views were largely formed in the crucible of political 
experience and comparison to the best available institutional analogues (the 
state constitutions).219 
Ultimately, the key principle I take from the political economy literature is 
simply that there are significant costs to individual decisionmaking and that 
these costs are likely to have an effect on the formation of groups, majorities 
and minorities alike. For example, decisionmaking at small numbers is likely to 
be very easy but at large numbers may be far more costly. This emphasis on the 
transaction costs of decisionmaking is shared by a variety of scholars of 
political economy, from James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock,220 to Oliver 
Williamson and Douglass North.221 Notice, however, that in borrowing this 
concept, I have not limited it to particular political theories but, in deference to 
my reading of the Founding, have combined what are sometimes considered 
antithetical political risks. I do not assume, here, for example, that government 
always malfunctions or small interest groups always win (a staple of some 
219. The Federalist No. 47, at 327-31 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) 
(examining state constitutional experience); The Federalist No. 48, at 334-38 (James 
Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) (examining the experience of the state constitutions on 
the separation of powers). 
220. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 80, at 1 12 ("The expected costs of 
organizing decision, under any given rule, will be less in the smaller unit than in the larger, 
assuming that the populations of each are roughly comparable.") (emphasis in original). 
221. North, supra note 216, at ch. 4 (emphasizing the role of institutions in reducing 
transaction costs); Williamson, supra note 148 (arguing that there are diminishing returns to 
scale in all organizations due to organizational transaction costs). 
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modern public choice theory); nor do I accept the rosy picture that majorities 
are always capable of having their way (a staple of the older pluralist 
literature). Instead, I consider both possibilities, as ones that institutional 
designers must consider. As I said earlier, the key here is to aim for 
convergence and that requires not only that the economic or political concept 
might "work," but that there is some basis in the traditional legal canon that 
recommends "fit" with the problem. The problem posed by the constitutive 
provisions of the Constitution is to determine how one is to know the effects of 
a shift in decisionmakers (or a shift from one aggregation of citizens to 
another). Institutional economics and positive political theory provide us with 
rough presumptions based on the size of the group. At the same time, this 
notion that "numbers matter" and that the costs of decisionmaking matter fits 
with very traditional constitutional law, law that reaches back to the Founders. 
Reread a variety of literature from the founding period, and you will find 
precisely this kind of assumption - that numbers and size matter in politics and 
constitution-making, and in predicting the risks of constitutional design.222 
Finally, I have insisted upon "relative" judgments or, to put it more 
accurately, judgments based on the available alternatives.223 One of the grave 
and repeated misunderstandings of any theory of constitutional structure is that 
it must assume that "democracy works" all the time or never. I have no 
illusions; indeed, unlike many of my interlocutors, I have personal experience 
of the pitfalls of governance. Yes, it is the worst government except all the 
others. The important point to see here, though, is that adopting a constitutive 
theory does not commit one to a view that representation works, works well, or 
even works most of the time. One may think that government in America is 
troubled and that representation is a fraud. One would still want, in my view, to 
ensure that the fraud was distributed lest it be compounded. The separation of 
powers is about distributing power, where power means aggregation of citizens. 
Representation, for good or ill, and for all the agency problems it possesses, is a 
problem distinct from the separation of a given set of agency relations. I do not 
assert here that representation works, but only that a shift in constituencies may 
make relative changes in constitutional structure with real effects on the 
222. The Federalist No. 5 1 is the canonical citation for this proposition as it opines that 
the "ambition" (otherwise, the incentives) of the departments must be made to counteract 
each other). The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961); see also 
supra note 45 (discussing the importance of the concepts of the "few" and the "many" 
among other numerical judgments during the constitutional convention); supra note 46 
(discussing notions of "dependence" and "independence," which were proxies at the time for 
judgments about the future behavior of government actors and how relationships between 
governmental actors would produce certain kinds of incentives; a judgment that one actor 
was "too" dependent on another, for example, was a claim that he would have too great an 
incentive to act as the other). 
223. James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening 
Divide Between America and Europe 16-17 (2003) (arguing that "relative claims can be a 
good bit more revealing than absolute ones"). 
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representative relation distinct from the standard agency problems. 
D. Popular Constitutionalism: A Coda 
In a wonderfully imaginative book published in 1994, Richard Parker 
identified what I believe to be the great pathology of late twentieth-century 
constitutionalism: "[W]e constitutional lawyers," he argued, "have fed on 
disdain for the political energy of ordinary people."224 During the past forty 
years, structural theory has become a debate largely about lawyers and courts, 
and their relation to the administrative state. Many have noted that all that 
"formalism" and "functionalism" seem to describe, as constitutional theories, is 
a mood, an intuition, or a result.225 Indeed, one might go so far as to say that 
there is only one real difference between these two views: If one approves of 
the New Deal, one finds oneself in the functionalist camp (because one must 
find some rationale for the administrative state); otherwise, one tries to find a 
way to accommodate the formalist cases in a nonformal world. 
This is not even an excuse for a theory of a whole constitution. And, lest 
one think that the theories that we teach have no influence on law, one need 
only look to the output of the Supreme Court in the past few years. Recall the 
great political cases involving different presidents, but the same judiciocentric 
self-regard. Think of Clinton v. Jones and read about the man who "just 
happened to be President."226 Or think of Bush v. Gore and read nary a mention 
of the Constitution's remission of electoral contests to Congress, rather than the 
courts.227 These are deeply self-referential decisions, decisions that reveal 
enduring misunderstandings about the political provisions of the Constitution. 
If there is anything that a vertical approach helps us to see it is that: Regardless 
of what we think about the state of modern government, if we erase politics 
from the Constitution, we risk erasing the people. As Bruce Ackerman has so 
richly warned us, over and over again, history tells a story in which the people 
have - for over two hundred years - found ways to change a system that 
refuses to recognize their sovereignty. And the "ways" that they have found 
have been through what we conventionally call the "separation of powers."228 
224. Parker, supra note 208, at 66. 
225. See, e.g., Tushnet, Bowls and Plateaus, supra note 37, at 581-85 (questioning the 
real differences between formal and functional approaches and considering them largely 
rhetorical). 
226. For a discussion of Clinton v. Jones in greater depth, see Nourse, Vertical 
Separation, supra note 37, at 768-72. 
227. It is widely held, even by scholars who tend toward support of strong executive 
power, that the Constitution and federal law remit disputed electoral contests to Congress. 
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, A Political Question, in Bush v. Gore: The Question of 
Legitimacy 134, 138-39 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002). According to Calabresi, "The failure 
... to consider Congress's constructive role was a mistake." Id. at 135. 
228. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 21-25. 
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A constitution constitutes, it creates, it unleashes power in ways that live. 
My point here is not the traditional one about the "lived" constitution - that the 
Constitution must "keep up" with the times. In fact, as a matter of structure, 
that is deeply wrong. On structural matters, I am decidedly conservative: I am 
deeply reverent of the Founders' pragmatic vision, and I believe strongly that if 
there is any place caution is merited in constitutional law, it is in the structure 
of the document. Change our representational structure and you change our 
form of government; Madison knew this, and he knew that the form of 
government resided, in the end, in the hands of the people.229 A generative 
anatomy thus describes something that must continue to happen, that is in a 
sense absent from the text because it resides in the future and thus lives. It is 
thus dynamic and must be so.230 
It is precisely because the Constitution gives life to government that it must 
change even if its texts stay the same. To ignore this force, to see the document 
as only constraint, is to risk seeing the Constitution as empty of the people it 
constitutes.231 If the new wave of scholarship on popular constitutionalism is to 
prevail over older modes, it should not be seen as a new constitutional 
methodology, but instead as a new constitutional humility, as courts and 
scholars begin to understand their place in the constitutional order. May this 
structural anatomy assist us in making such a vision appear not only important, 
but possible. May it lead us to rethink our obsession with judicial review and 
consider that the first question must be one of constitutional structure, as a 
whole. 
229. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 46: 
The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their 
reasoning on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as 
mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to 
usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. 
They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides 
in the people alone .... 
The Federalist No. 46, at 3 15 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961). 
230. See, e.g., Dewey, supra note 1, at 14. According to Dewey, "A thinking being 
can, accordingly, act on the basis of the absent and the future." Id. 
23 1 . See Arendt, supra note 1 3, at 155-56. 
